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1 
Introduction 
 
Since the Spanish conquest of the New World, Cuba has played an exceptional role in global and 
hemispheric history. For last the two centuries, Cuban exceptionalism has been impregnated by 
its bipolar relationship with the United States. The foundation was laid by John Adams who 
considered Cuba a natural appendage to the North American continent. At the end of the 
nineteenth century, US foreign policy to Cuba was designed to unleash the Cuban nationalist 
sentiment for independence from Spain. When the US saw the opportunity to subordinate the 
Caribbean island to US interests, it did so, for almost half a century. In 1959, Fidel Castro ended 
US domination in the midst of the Cold War. The Cuban Revolution perpetuated the Cuba-US 
relationship reluctantly. First, Cuban migration to the United States was characterized as 
temporary by many; during the Cold War, Washington would not allow a communist regime to 
take root 90 miles off its Florida shores (Pedraza-Bailey, 1985: 9-12). Nowadays, the Cuban 
regime is still in power, and political and economic hardship on the island have created multiple 
Cuban migration waves to the United States. Nowadays, Cuban Americans comprise 15 per cent 
of the total Cuban population living in Cuba and the United States. The largest Cuban American 
community (CAC), almost half (961,516, US Consensus, 2015), lives in Miami-Dade country. 
Over the course of the Cuban Revolution different migration waves, cohorts and 
generations have constituted the demographics of the CAC in Miami. The volatility of the 
(geo)political and economic context wherein Cuba-US relations occurred incited the respective 
governments in Havana and Washington to design policies and laws that regulated Cuban 
migration. Cuban migration was variously described as being ‘political’ directly after the Castro 
took power, to ‘economic’ starting in the 1980s. Besides migration policies, both governments 
have dominated the transnational social space of the two communities, through policies that 
allowed or blocked the realization of transnational ties. Next to the (geo)political and economic 
context, the evolution of Cuba-US relations was subject to the changing presidents of either 
nation-state. In Cuba, Fidel Castro had a consecutive rule of 47 years until his brother Raúl took 
power in 2006. In the United States several presidents have resided in the White House over the 
period of the Cuban Revolution. 
The transnational identity of the CAC in Miami has shifted over time, dictated by different 
rationales for having transnational linkages across the Florida Straits; from a hard-line and 
militant hatred towards the Castro regime during the first years after the Cuban Revolution, to a 
more moderate, progressive and conciliatory posture during the last two decades. Even the death 
of Cuba American National Foundation founder and anti-Castro hardliner Jorgé Mas Canos in 
1997, heralded a shift of position towards Cuba by a representative institution of the CAC in 
Miami. The growing desire of Cuban Americans in Miami to rebuild transnational bridges didn’t 
go unnoticed by politicians in Washington; Barack Obama got almost half of the Cuban American 
vote in Florida for his campaign promises to seek to normalize bilateral relations with Cuba. 
President Obama redeemed his promise on December 17, 2014. President Raúl Castro and 
President Obama announced that both countries would seek rapprochement after more than 50 
years of antagonism. In Miami the reactions were split; the more recent arrivals and American-
Born Cubans (ABCs) were open to binational engagement, while most of the first political exiles 
were opposed (Caputo and Flechas, 2014). 
 This research will seek to answer to the following research question: What are the main 
rationales that have transformed the transnational identity of the CAC in Miami towards Cuba? and 
how have the (geo)political and economic context, and US and Cuban government policies influenced 
the (non-)existence of a blocked transnational social space between Miami and Cuba? From my 
preliminary research on the topic, the following hypothesis has emerged and will be supported or 
disproved in my research: demographic evolution has changed the transnational identity of the CAC 
in Miami and torn down the ‘Cold Wall’, created by Cuban and US government policies to prevent the 
American-Cuban community in Miami from materializing their desire to have transnational ties with 
Cuba. The methodology that will facilitate the research is a literature review and analysis of 
existing data on demographic and transnational evolution, and the fieldwork will be undertaken 
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through qualitative interviews with Cuban Americans of different generations, cohorts and 
migration waves in Miami, as well as scholars and experts in the field of transnationalism within 
Cuban and Cuban-American Studies. 
The first chapter elaborates the most significant perspectives in the current academic 
debate on transnationalism; together with the framework in which migration occurs in the 
creation of a diaspora, in particular the theoretic debate on the context wherein an exile 
community comes into existence, and the role of nation-states, will lead us to the existence of the 
‘impossible triangle’: how a transnational identity is formed in the context of an exile community, 
and how this formation process can differ among generations and different cohorts of the 
diaspora. This section will analyse how migration and transnationalism can be regulated to serve 
the purposes of nation-states. 
The second part will describe the exceptional historical context of the binational 
relationship between Cuba and the United States. It will address the most significant variables 
that constitute the transnational identity of the different generations and cohorts of the CAC in 
Miami. Furthermore, it will address the demographic evolution of the CAC through the waves of 
migration, and how the Cuban and US government have regulated migration, each influenced by 
mutations of the (geo)political and economic context of the bilateral relation. Next, the 
transnational policies that Havana and Washington conducted to create, but also block, the 
materialization of the transnational desire of the CAC in Miami will be outlined. Finally, this 
chapter will analyse the new road to ‘normalization’ initiated by President Raúl Castro and Obama 
that is tearing down ‘the Cold Wall’. 
The third chapter will discuss the foundation and development of the transnational social 
space that is currently in existence. It will synthesize the historically grounded analysis of the 
second chapter, along with the quantitative data of various institutions in the United States and 
the qualitative findings of my own research in Miami’s CAC, to argue how the transnational 
identity of the CAC in Miami has evolved and differs by generation, cohort, and migration waves 
in the historical and contemporary context of binational relations. Using quantitative data, I show 
the manifestation of transnational identity among the CAC in Miami, made possible by 
government policies, which are substantiated by the narratives of the interviewees. 
The last section of the research concludes with a discussion of the most significant 
concepts, variables and findings of the theory, the case study and fieldwork and attempts to 
answer the research question that will strengthen or weaken my hypothesis. 
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Chapter 1  
Transnationalism: Normative Versus Blocked 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter provides the theoretical grounds upon which the analysis of the case study, data and 
field research is based. The first part will analyse the history of transnationalism, how it is defined 
and why scholars found it significant to address within migration and diaspora studies. In the 
context of the case study, transnationalism is the realm wherein a nation-state and diaspora are 
involved in the creation and implementation of a transnational social space and transnational 
linkages across borders. The academic debate on these two entities is played out in the course of 
analysing their relationship in the context of an exile community. For individuals within the 
diaspora, transmigrant and transnational identity are debated to identify the variables that 
ground transnational behaviour. Subsequently, the political, economic, and sociocultural 
dimensions of transnational engagement that constitute the current scholarly debate are 
elaborated. In the third section these dimensions are deepened by anchoring them into the realm 
of generations, cohorts and migration waves, and the most important variables that produce 
divisions in transnational identity, and therefore behaviour. To engage with the specific historical 
context of an exile community, the last section will address the existence of an ‘impossible 
triangular’ relationship between the homeland, ‘host’ country and the diaspora, and debate how 
government policies and laws in the nation of origin and in the host country have created the 
concept of ‘blocked transnationalism’. 
 
1.1 The Evolution of Transnationalism 
 
For a large part of the twentieth century the scope of migrant researchers was aimed at processes 
like adaptation, assimilation, and acculturation, which constituted the behaviour and experiences 
of migrants in the nation-state of resettlement. The popular presumption has always been that an 
‘immigrant’ comes to resettle and pledge their alliance to the ‘new’ country, whereas a ‘migrant’ 
comes for economic benefits and at a certain point will return to the nation of origin. Basch et al. 
concluded that the lives and experiences of immigrants cannot be analysed as strictly separated 
from country of origin and the nation of resettlement. Immigrants today develop networks, 
patterns of living, activities and ideologies that bridge the homeland and host country (1994: 3-
6). Thus in the 1990s some sociologist refocused its research on immigrants: 
 
as a social category distinct from racial and ethnic minorities and on immigration as an 
international process that reshuffles persons and cultures across nations... under the 
impact of changes in the nature of modern communications at this century’s end, many 
immigrants fail to shed their old identities and totally assimilate. Instead, they developed 
new bicultural identities and live[d] their lives and are quite involved in more than one 
nation, more than one world – in effect making the home and adopted countries both one 
lived social world. (Pedraza and Back, 2012) 
 
The study of transnationalism – defined as linkages transcending national borders – was in 
addition to concepts such as adaptation and assimilation in the new country, and thus enabled a 
more extensive analysis of the migrants’ lives after resettlement (Vertovec, 2001: 573-574). 
Calhoun stresses that a wide variety of binational connections can characterize transnationalism, 
e.g. the movement of people or capital, and can take on forms of sociocultural interexchange 
(2002: 490). 
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1.1.2 The transnational framework of the nation-state and the diaspora 
 
In the study of nationalism the ‘nation’ is defined as ‘a people who share common origins and 
history as displayed by their shared culture, language and identity’, while the ‘state’ is understood 
to be a ‘sovereign system of government within a particular territory’. A nation-state can be 
considered as a geographic space that is constituted as one unit, defined by frontiers and wherein 
political and economic organization is conducted. In the realm of these boundaries lies the 
sovereignty and the homeland of its citizens, and the social order that is separated from outer 
territories (Wimmer and Glick Schiller, 2002: 309). Torres argues that: 
 
Under this notion of organization, public power is organized and contested within the 
geographic boundaries of nation-states, which also define the economic and social 
organization of societies. (2014: 22) 
 
The state is determined to regulate the public affairs of the nation; for whom and when the nation-
state bears responsibility for these affairs varies widely, but activities that have to do with 
bilateral engagement with other nations are considered under foreign affairs of the state. 
Therefore, regardless of the domestic implications migration causes, transnational linkages are 
mostly accommodated through foreign affairs (Torres, 2014: 22-23). 
All the citizens residing outside a nation-state, who identify themselves with an imagined 
or actual ‘homeland’ and who maintain actual or affective ties with people of the same ethnic 
identity are the diaspora. The diaspora can contain different kinds of individuals: expatriates, 
expellees, political refugees, alien resident, immigrants and ethnic and racial minorities. The 
members of the diaspora define themselves, or are identified by others as part of the population 
of the nation of origin, and therefore called upon to act in homeland affairs. Three types of 
members define the diaspora: 1) core members, who are the organizing elite, participate in 
diasporic affairs and have the ability to mobilize the diaspora; 2) passive members have to be 
motivated by the leadership for diasporic affairs; and 3) silent members, who are uninvolved in 
the communities affairs but may be mobilized during crisis. The diaspora can function in the host 
country as an ethnic lobby or proponent of multicultural foreign policy, but also to advocate 
democratization of dictatorial regimes in the homeland, or be significant for the homeland’s 
economy. Members of the diaspora can strive to free or enrich themselves, but object to the same 
for the people in the nation of origin (Cohen, 2008: 1; Shain and Barth, 2003: 450-452; Berg and 
Eckstein, 2015: 2). 
Portes and Rumbaut distinguish four types of migrants in the diaspora: 1) labour 
migrants; 2) professional immigrants; 3) immigrant entrepreneurs; and 4) refugees and asylum 
seekers (Portes, 2014: 29-43). These types can be divided into cohorts of political and economic 
migration. The moral difference between a political refugee and an economic migrant is set out 
clearly by Kunz: 
 
the reluctance to uproot oneself [political refugee], and the absence of positive original 
motivations to settle elsewhere, which characterizes all refugee decisions and distinguishes the 
refugee from the voluntary migrants. (1973: 130) 
Within a diaspora the ‘vintages’ or groups of political refugees are separated by ‘character, 
background and avowed political faith’ (1973: 137). Pedraza argues that ‘vintages’ are defined by 
attitudes, while waves are defined by timing (1995: 312). The vintages or cohorts of a political 
exodus can differ in social class, religion, or educational background. Refugee movement from the 
homeland can be acute and anticipatory, and cause friction within the diaspora: 
 
While the refugee of today leaves, the refugee of tomorrow endeavours to stall off further 
advance by working in retreat for a compromise. As the political situation ripens for each, 
they will leave the country as distinct 'vintages' each usually convinced of the moral and 
political rightness of his actions and implicitly or openly blaming those who departed 
earlier or stayed on. (1973: 137) 
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Stein emphasizes that the two types of migration are defined by a push-and-pull mechanism. The 
political refugee is pushed out by the political situation, characterized by great dissatisfaction with 
the political system and perceived danger to their livelihood, while economic migrants are pulled 
out of their nation of origin because of prospects of a better life in another country (1981: 322). 
 
1.1.3 Transnationalism and identity 
 
As immigrants construct linkages that transcend national boundaries, a transnational social 
space1 is constructed, and the concept of ‘transnational identity’ is questioned. Esteban-Gutiart 
argues from a sociocultural approach that the archetype of any identity is the ‘learner identity’. 
This identity is constructed by a learning process due to participation in formal and informal 
educational activities through which individuals perceive themselves as learners, a formation 
based on the idea that: 
 
identity is a semiotically-mediated act and is therefore a narrative product which is 
ordered, thus giving unity and purpose to the experience... Secondly, it is intimately linked 
with actions or participation in scenarios of educational activity, whether in a school, 
through new information technologies, or within the peer group, family or the community 
in general. Finally,... identity is constructed through recognition. (2015:19) 
 
The learner identity constructs all other identities, whether ethnic, national, religious or 
transnational. Like any identity, the transnational identity is a cultural phenomenon of a type that 
links multiple nations; the sense of identity from the nation of origin cannot be replaced by the 
host country, nor the opposite. Therefore, transnationalism and identity can be can be 
accomplished as a transnational social space that is constructed from the perception of sharing 
some form of common identity, which is most likely based upon a place of origin and the cultural 
and lingual characteristics that correlate with it; they imply a desire to sustain linkages through 
movement and communication of resources and information. But at the same time the identity of 
these same individuals or groups are created by sociocultural contexts that transcend countries 
borders. Basch et al. (1994) refer to social exclusion, economic insecurity and racism as rationales 
for transnational activism among migrants, while Goldring underpins transnational linkages as 
the desire to obtain social status and reinforcement of one’s identity in the community (1998, 189; 
Esteban-Gutiart, 2015:18-19; Vertovec, 2001: 573-574). 
Migrants who create and maintain social, cultural, economic, religious or political 
structures between the ‘home’ country and host country are described as ‘transmigrant’. These 
transnational linkages are often characterized by short duration or as having a more profound 
and sustainable character (Glick Schiller et al., 1995: 48; Dahinden, 2010: 52). Through the 
transnational social space of the diaspora between the homeland and the host country, the 
transmigrants are: 
 
increasingly able to promote transnational ties, to act as bridges or as mediators between 
their home and host societies, and to transmit the values of pluralism and democracy as 
well as the ‘entrepreneurial spirit and skills that their home countries so sorely lack’. 
(Shain and Barth, 2003: 450) 
 
                                                          
1 ‘combinations of social and symbolic ties, positions in networks and organizations, and networks of organizations that 
can be found in at least two geographically and internationally distinct places. These spaces denote dynamic social 
processes, not static notions of ties and positions. Social ties are a continuing series of inter-personal transactions to 
which participants attach shared interests, obligations, expectations and norms. Symbolic ties are a continuing series of 
transactions, both face-to-face and indirect, to which participants match shared meanings, memories, future 
expectations and symbols. Symbolic ties often go beyond face-to-face relations, involving members of the same religious 
belief, language, ethnicity or nationality’ (Faist, 1998: 216). 
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According to methodological transnationalism, transmigrants are presumed to remain loyal to 
their homeland as long as they are not being absorbed by the host country through assimilation 
and naturalization. Identity is often defined by loyalty to nations or nation-states, and for migrants 
who feel at home in both or multiple countries it is difficult to decide where they belong. Thus, 
most transmigrants have not fully conceptualized or articulated a form of transnational identity. 
Transmigrants call ‘home’ the country of origin, although they are capable of creating a home in 
the host society. As national belonging is uncertain, it can make civic society in both host- and 
homeland to question the transmigrants’ loyalty and the legitimacy of its transnational identity. 
The bilateral relation between the respective nation-states also affects the tolerance shown to 
multiple versus exclusive national loyalties; when the bilateral relationship is antagonistic, the 
concept of ‘dual loyalty’ becomes a loaded subject in relation to the transnational identity of 
migrants (Basch et al.], 1994: 3-7; Wimmer and Glick Schiller, 2002: 309; Waldinger and 
FitzGerald, 2004: 1178-79, 1184). 
 
1.2 The Creation of Transnational Bridges 
 
The study on transnationalism displays two divergent observations on how the transnational 
identity is present in the life of a transmigrant through ‘actual’ and ‘affective’ transnational ties. 
The idea of transnationalism as ‘actual’ ties is asserted by Portes et al. and constitutes 
transnationalism as a form of practice, and of tangible ties. Under their definition transnationalism 
is demarcated as ‘activities that require regular and sustained social contacts over time across 
national borders for their implementation’ (1999: 219). The essence of transnational ties lies in 
the realization of cross-border connections that can be observed and form innumerable linkages. 
Grassroots associations2 are argued to be capable of facilitating the creation and preservation of 
transnational ties. Being characterized by a higher education and/or occupational status increases 
the probability of a transmigrant constructing economic, political and sociocultural transnational 
linkages (Portes, 2007: 84). Schiller et al. (1995) and Levitt (2004) think of transnationalism as a 
process of preserving ‘affective’ transnational ties that underline transmigrants’ ethnic identity 
and loyalties towards the nation of origin. This transnational process depends upon: 
 
the affective ties – real or imagined – that immigrants maintain through the reinforcement 
of ethnonational identities and the preservation of homeland loyalties. (1995: 48) 
 
The actualization of this transnational process can be constructed within the diaspora – 
commemorative events, community bans or protests – or together with the homeland. Those 
‘affective linkages’ between nation-states constitute transnationalism as a ‘lived-experience’ 
through the eyes of a transmigrant (Huynh and Yiu, 2015: 162). 
In the creation of a transnational social field, Al-Ali et al. make a distinction between 
transnational activities and capabilities, variables which elaborate the theoretical concepts 
debated above. Transnational activities constitute actual political, economic, and sociocultural 
engagement; these practices can be observed and measured, while transnational capabilities 
encompass the migrants willingness and capacity for cross-border engagement, as well as the 
extent to which migrants identify with social, economic or political processes in their home 
country (experience). Being involved in transnational practices requires skills and resources, 
which are determined by variables of opportunities and length of time in the host country. 
Subsequently, direct transnational activities concern a focus on the homeland, while indirect 
transnational activity is aimed at actors outside of the home country: 
 
                                                          
2 ‘[G]rassroots associations are locally based, significantly autonomous, volunteer run, formal nonprofit groups that 
manifest significant voluntary altruism as a group.... grassroots organizations tend to be smaller, more informal, and 
lack the resources of older NGOs. The work of a grassroots organization can focus on advocacy on behalf of a community 
or organizing of the community itself’ (Adler, 2012: 237). 
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Taking the case of refugee or exile groups... indirectly, transnational activities might also 
include the application of pressure on the host government or international organizations 
for change in the home country, or indeed the promotion of the rights of the exile 
community itself. Capabilities also centre upon the internal organization of migrant or 
exile communities, and the level of motivation to maintain group solidarity. (2001: 581) 
 
Additional, Dahinden stresses that the concepts of ‘mobility’ and ‘locality’ have been under 
researched in the study of transnational formations. Mobility is defined as the physical movement 
of people in a transnational social space. Locality is explained as being rooted or anchored socially, 
economically or politically in the host country and/or in the sending country, and the desire to 
have social transnational relations. All these variables blend into different transnational linkages 
as: 
 
migrants settled in their new country develop forms of transnational social space that are 
different from those of migrants engaged in continuous transnational circulation. 
(Dahinden, 2010:52) 
 
Emphasizing the different types of migration argued by Portes and Rumbaut, Al-Ali et al. argue 
that there is no doubt that labour migrants display much more flexibility and mobility than 
refugees, and therefore their transnational lives are different (2001: 586). 
 
1.2.1 Political transnationalism 
 
The political dimension of transnationalism is explained as a relation through political 
organization between the ‘homeland’ and the diaspora, but also through the foreign policy of the 
country of resettlement. In the homeland, political transnational activism by the diaspora can be 
perceived in multiple ways, e.g. as challenging the state institutions of citizenship and loyalty, as 
a threat to political and economic self-determination, particularly in the fields of macroeconomic 
policy and immigration, or to regain territory that is populated by ethnic kin in a sovereign state. 
In this way the diaspora is used as a geopolitical and geographical weapon to extend the political 
organization of the nation-state; it perpetuates an important linkage within the relationship 
between domestic and international politics of the nation of origin (Shain and Barth, 2003: 449; 
Calhoun, 2002: 490). 
However, the political determination of the diaspora regarding the homeland is not 
naturally active, can be downplayed by external variables and can change over migrant 
generations. Portes and Rumbaut argue that if class is contemplated, first-generation 
professionals are more prone to engage in transnational political activism, and later on add the 
politics of the country of resettlement. But working class migrant labourers are less interested in 
engaging in politics, unless exclusion through racism or activism of the original inhabitants drives 
them to reactive mobilization. Ethnic minorities within the diaspora are likely to support 
progressive candidates and parties that expose a political agenda based on social equality to 
improve their own socioeconomic situation. Second and subsequent generations confirm Torres’ 
claim that political activism is focused on ‘host’ country issues, as well the ethics and loyalty that 
are connected to it (2015, 211-213; Portes and Mozo, 1985: 53). 
Political exile organizations seek to display an image of unity critical for obtaining national 
and international support, and to counter other political claims or groups in the home country or 
in the diaspora. International support for exile organizations can be acquired via three actors: 
enemies of the home regime, the home regime’s allies, and agents interpreted as being remote 
from the dispute. Refugees who engage in political activism towards their homeland are not 
primarily motivated by material gain, but by national commitment. But if exile organizations fail 
to obtain their objectives over time, the support of the diaspora for political activism reduces 
(Shain, 2005: 29, 37, 54, 115, 125). The demographic of the diaspora is significant for the group 
from which exile organizations will gain support for their cause, and: 
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a decisive influence on the nature of a diaspora pool is the home regime’s policy of 
migration. Home regimes that encourage or force nationals to go abroad expand the pool 
of potential exile supporters but calculate that, by externalizing dissent, they will reduce 
the ability of their opponents to undermine the regime. (Shain, 2005: 54) 
 
Other government policies that determine the transnational social space are the host country 
government’s tolerance for assimilation or multiculturalism, requisites postulated for the migrant 
to obtain residence and citizenship, but also the structure and resources facilitated for the 
diaspora to materialize their transnational identity. Furthermore, administrations have the power 
to influence transmigrants’ activism through policies and laws that control movement, e.g. by 
approving arrivals and departures. These policies’ effectiveness depends on their degree of 
institutionalization, and the means and dedication applied to make them effective (Berg and 
Eckstein, 2015: 5-6). Nation-states’ ability to block or provide transnational social space is further 
elaborated in the last section of this chapter. 
 
1.2.2 Economic transnationalism 
 
Some scholars indicate that the main cause of perpetuating migration and transnationalism is 
capitalism’s evolution or the ‘high points of globalization’ (Basch et al., 1994), through its 
extensive cultivation of technological development. A diaspora is able to increase and enhance 
transnational linkages. But the distinction between economic globalization and 
transnationalization is found in the limited space of transnational linkages between two or 
multiple countries, while globalization is non-territorial (Levitt and Jaworsky, 2007: 134; Duany, 
2007: 163; Faist, 1998: 217). Portes stresses that at the micro level: 
 
Migrants’ transnationalism can thus be understood as a form of grassroots response to the 
inequities and the economic difficulties that motivated their migration in the first place. It 
is a form of ‘globalization from below’ that countermands, at least in a partial way, the 
inequality-deepening ‘globalization from above’ promoted by the interests of corporate 
capitalism. It is in this context that one fully understands the implications of Carlos 
Ramos's (2002) remark (…) that migration and remittances are the true economic 
adjustment program of the poor. (2007: 80) 
 
On the macro level, the globalization of capitalism has created a vicious circle: the dependency of 
developed countries on cheap labour from underdeveloped countries who are, in their turn, 
dependent on remittances sent by their diaspora. Various forms of capital acquired in the host 
country create the ability to contribute to the development and growth of the homeland economy 
(Landolt et al., 1999: 297-300). For these countries, economic transnationalism becomes a great 
source of income and investment through the capital injected by the diaspora via remittances sent 
to family and friends. This especially counts for nations in the developing world, which policies 
and laws can stimulate and enhance, but which also block economic cross-border engagement 
that influences the well-being of its people (Berg and Eckstein, 2015: 6). Eckstein argues that: 
 
The transnational impact remittances have hinges on the social context in which they are 
embedded. States constitute an important part of that context. They, in principle, have the 
capacity to control cross-border income transfers, to appropriate money for themselves, 
and to regulate usages the recipients make of remittances. (2009: 207) 
 
Financial capital coming from the diaspora funds public policies, private businesses, and social 
service projects in the homeland. Some recipient countries even use the prospect of remittances 
flowing into their economy to upgrade their credibility with international monetary institutions 
and thereby obtain loans (Levitt and Jaworsky, 2007: 134-136). But economic transnational ties 
can also endanger sovereignty in the homeland through its dependence on external capital, 
making the population indifferent to domestic causes. It may also undermine the societal 
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structures in the homeland for reward based on education, merit and hard work. Furthermore, 
segmented transnational networks based on class, ethnicity, gender and regional differences 
make societies susceptible to social inequality and domestic instability (Eckstein, 2010: 1652). 
  
1.2.3 Sociocultural transnationalism 
 
The sociocultural dimension of transnationalism is discussed here by structuring the social 
interplay between immigrants of the diaspora and non-immigrants in the homeland. Besides the 
actual transnational linkages, transnationalism is defined as living a transmigrant life; the 
transnational linkages seen as a process that maintains the affective ties of a ethnonational 
identity. The sociocultural transnational linkages are created by travelling, sending remittances, 
and telecommunication with those living there, but also through funding or organizing social 
projects that may include cultural experiences, schools and infrastructure in one’s hometown 
(Huynh and Yiu, 2015: 162). 
Carling focusses on the asymmetrical social relationship between the transmigrant, who 
resides outside of the homeland, and the non-migrant who is living in the country of origin to 
analyse the sociocultural process and practice of transnationalism. At the micro level, Carling 
claims that intrinsic asymmetries exist in transnational relationships. This intrinsic imbalance can 
be a source of frustration in the transnational social space of this relation, but it does not 
necessarily mean that there is an imbalance of power between the two actors: 
 
On the contrary, transnational practices are shaped by the multi-faceted nature of the 
relationship, with migrants and non-migrants experiencing vulnerability and ascendancy 
at different times and in different contexts. (2008: 1453) 
 
Therefore, a practical analysis of the sociocultural dimension of transnational linkages between 
migrants and non-immigrants displays three asymmetrical differences: 1) the position taken 
towards transnational moralities, as pre- and post-migration experiences, staying in the 
homeland, and return have inherent moral dimensions; 2) access to information, different 
resources of imagination, and different creation of images about the various components of the 
transnational social field; and 3) differential distribution of not only material resources, but also 
legal entitlements to mobility and residence, and cultural and linguistic resources (2008: 1453-
1457). Immigrants who are mobile, are more likely to be part of a decision-making process in the 
homeland that doesn’t necessarily affect them, but does affect the immobile citizens in that 
country. In addition, the relationship between those who migrate and those who stay is often 
unequal as the migrants are often given leadership roles and demand respect (Kivisto and Faist, 
2009: 155). 
 As we will see in the section on transmigrant generations, assimilation and acculturation 
focus on the cultural (inter)exchange within the boundaries of one nation-state. On a 
transnational level, cultural interplay between diaspora and the homeland is capable of shaping 
the transnational identity – immigrant and non-immigrant communities that acculturate through 
a transnational relationship. Intercultural exchange occurs through the mutual involvement and 
preservation of cultural expression. This process materializes through fiestas and celebrations 
associated with religious traditions that are taken to the country of resettlement. But at the same 
time, the homeland is transformed by the sociocultural characteristics that are brought through 
transnational linkages from the ‘host’ country. Levitt and Jaworsky claim that the cultural 
transformation in the ‘host’ country and the homeland brings with it the politics of belonging and 
citizenship. Through the power of art and culture migrants are able to express, create, remember 
and recreate their identity, individually or collectively, whether national or hybrid. A flipside of 
transnational acculturation by means of the ‘high of capitalism’ is argued to erase cultural identity 
(2007: 139-140). 
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1.3. Transnational Migrant Generations 
 
As the fundamental variables of transnationalism are identified, this phenomenon can be set apart 
by different generations and cohorts within migration studies. This is to say that transnational 
ties differ among generation and cohorts within a diaspora and even within the community in one 
place owing to different variables. This section will elaborate the most salient characteristics that 
constitute these differences. 
 
1.3.1 Generations within transnationalism 
 
Although transnational economic, political, and sociocultural linkages have increased in the 
triangular relationship between the diaspora, the homeland and the country of resettlement, Berg 
and Eckstein argue that we lack knowledge. The concept of generations has been less significant 
within the literature on transnationalism than in the assimilationist framework. In this field of 
study: 
 
the concept of generation has been fundamental to the scholarly understanding of migrant 
adaptation, especially within the assimilationist and transnational frameworks. (Berg and 
Eckstein, 2015:1) 
 
In general, these studies focus on the differences within genealogical generations – the division 
between migrants that have been born in the homeland and the next familial generation, who are 
their children. Migrants born in the ‘home’ country are the ‘first generation’, their children are the 
‘second generation’. In the social sciences generations can also refer to age- or birth date-based 
cohorts with distinctive historical experiences, life-stage groups or people who lived in a specific 
historical period (Eckstein and Berg, 2015: 178). Mannheim underscores generations as a: 
 
particular kind of identity of location, embracing related ‘age groups’ embedded in a 
historical-social process. (1970: 382) 
 
By taking ‘historical experiences’ and ‘age cohort’ into account, Rumbaut stresses the ability to 
deconstruct generations by 1) the 1.75 generation, who are children that migrated in early 
childhood (ages 0–5), and whose experience and adaptive outcomes are close to the U.S born 
second generation; 2) the 1.5 generation, who are children that have immigrated to the United 
States before the age of 12, are of primary school age and literate in their mother tongue, but the 
majority of their education is undertaken in the country of resettlement; and 3) the 1.25 
generation, who leave as adolescents (ages 13–17), and who possibly arrive alone and participate 
in secondary schools or in the work force. The 1.25 generation is considered the closest to the first 
generation, as they have already acquired some lived experience (2004: 1162). 
Duany argues that like the first generation, the second generation does not completely 
break down transnational engagement with their homeland, but do display reduced activity such 
as sending remittances, although remaining ethnically identified with the country of origin. 
Immigrant children create a bicultural identity, which is balanced between the family tradition 
and the culture of the ‘host’ land. These children combine the two structures through the 
development of multicultural and multilingual skills, which become part of their identity (2011: 
29; Esteban-Guitart and Vila, 2015: 18). The genealogical behaviour of the second generation is 
described as ‘reactive blocked transnationalism’ in the sense that they react to the covert conduct 
of transnationalism by the first generation; they openly interact with the homeland government 
and organizations, thus earning recognition that revitalizes the ethnic identity of the diaspora. The 
second generation doesn’t carry the weight of history on their shoulders and therefore are able to 
manoeuvre themselves more easily towards being effective transmigrants. This contrast in 
historical context with the first generation can cause inter-generational conflict, but mostly on a 
small scale (Huynh and Yiu, 2015: 4, 24-29). 
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Portes and Rumbaut emphasize three fundamental factors that contribute to the 
understanding of generational and cohort differences within a diaspora: 1) their individual 
features, including their age, education, occupational skills, wealth, and knowledge of English; 2) 
the social environment that receives them, including the policies of the host government, the 
attitudes of the native population, and the presence and size of a co-ethnic community; and 3) 
their family structure (2001: 46). 
 
1.3.2 Implications of assimilation and acculturation on transnational identity 
 
As the history of transnational studies shows, assimilation and acculturation were the first 
concepts of migrant life after resettlement to be analysed. Scholars have argued that assimilation 
into the host country and the preservation of an ethnic identity through acculturation of 
generations within the diaspora are crucial to the diaspora’s  transnational identity (Vertovec, 
2001: 573; Portes, 2007: 84; Berg and Eckstein, 2015: 2). 
The ‘assimilationist’ view on migration is ‘a singular, well-defined move from one bounded 
national space to another’ (Berg and Eckstein, 2015: 5). The extent of assimilation is addressed by 
these authors through the occurrence of: 1) learning the language; 2) adapting to the new 
country’s culture; 3) degree of educational and economic success; 4) participation in political and 
associational life; and 5) intermarriage with the native-born. Through acculturation within the 
diaspora, namely, the transmission of knowledge, traditions, legacy and other cultural activities 
within families and by institutions, ethnic identity is preserved. As perceptions of the ‘home’ 
country can be fluid and change over time as contexts change, the transfer of these variables 
among generations is important for the ethnic identification process and the transnational 
identity of generations in relation to the country of origin. Even if the actual transnational ties or 
the existence of generations that have a lived experience in the home country fade, the ethnic 
identity of the homeland will be preserved and transnational ties are more likely to be too (Berg 
and Eckstein, 2015: 4-8). 
Assimilationists view the second generation of a diaspora as assimilating and 
acculturating more than their parents and normally gaining improved economic success. 
Furthermore, they obtain extensive knowledge of their country of birth and of their parents 
(ibid.). Portes and Rumbaut doubt straightforward assimilation, owing to the many variables that 
assimilation is subject to. According to them, the second generation is better understood by the 
process of ‘segmented assimilation’. They emphasize that rapid integration and acceptance is just 
one of the alternatives, and that the degree of assimilation can be influenced decisively by four 
variables: 
 
1) the history of the immigrant first generation; 2) the pace of acculturation among 
parents and children and its bearing on normative integration; 3) the barriers, cultural 
and economic, confronted by second-generation youth in their quest for successful 
adaptation; and 4) the family and community resources for confronting these barriers. 
(2001: 45-46) 
 
These variables need to be assessed cautiously to comprehend the complexity of the process of 
assimilation and the transnational behaviour of the second generation (ibid.). The interplay of 
these components are likely to lead to different paths of assimilation: 
 
increasing acculturation and integration into the American middle class [classical 
assimilation theory] (Path 1)... acculturation and assimilation into the urban underclass, 
leading to poverty and downward mobility (Path 2). The third (Path 3), ‘selective 
acculturation’, is the deliberate preservation of the immigrant community’s culture and 
values, accompanied by economic integration. (Xie and Greenman, 2005: 3) 
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Portes and Rumbaut argue that assimilation in the United States in terms of becoming American 
‘just like the rest’ has never happened. Immigrants were not forced into cultural equality, but the 
strength of the American system in keeping the society heterogeneous, was the ability to create 
political space and structures that facilitated ethnic preservation and electoral mobilization. In 
defence of their own interests, immigrants fought for the interest of the greater nation. It made 
them ‘just as American as everybody else’ (Portes and Rumbaut, 2014: 213-214). 
  
1.3.3 Pre- and post-immigration experiences 
 
Berg and Eckstein also address how assimilationists forget to illuminate how the occurrence of 
migration – the historical background, and pre-migration experiences – influences their degree of 
assimilation and acculturation within the ‘host’ country’s society, and the constitution of a 
transnational identity. Berg and Eckstein declare that their generational frame exposes the 
differences and changes within the diaspora over time. A shared country of origin but divergent 
migration experiences within different time frames, they call a historical cohort. They emphasize 
the personal experience of the migrant before and during migration, and how these variables have 
influenced experiences of resettlement in the ‘host’ country. In this case, generations are divided 
by the historical event they have lived through, not by family generations. Furthermore, they 
argue that a pre-migration experience needs to be set apart through age, class, ethnicity, gender 
and sometimes regional differences. The historically grounded conception of generations 
enhances the ability to analyse the cultural experiences and behaviour of cohorts and generations 
within the diaspora, i.e. the migration experiences resonates with the new life situation in the 
country of resettlement and therefore is a prominent variable in distinguishing transnational 
behaviour and adaptation experiences (Berg and Eckstein, 2015: 1; Eckstein and Barberia 2002: 
800). 
 In the case of being exiled, the pre-migration experience is understood as forced 
separation due to the homeland’s political circumstances and, as a consequence, the inability to 
return. Torres calls this leaving by force and inability to return the political memory of exile. The 
process of being exiled and the political memory that comes with it acts first through physical 
removal (destierro) from the homeland, which in turn causes a personal dislocation (destiempo). 
Both include the loss of memory of a place: destierro is created through the geographical 
movement across borders to another nation-state, while destiempo is defined by the loss of social 
and personal structures in existence before going in exile. The political context of the homeland 
that influences the ability of the exiles to go back, covers up the reality that any return to the past 
or childhood is impossible. Thus, the personal desire of the exile to seek for balance between going 
back to the past and going on with life has become highly politicized. If the host country is hostile 
regarding the exile community, this increases the sense of isolation. A mutual sharing of political 
memory, culture and heritage creates the foundation for the diasporic and transnational identity 
among exiles (2014: 37-38). 
 
1.4. The Role of the Nation-State and Blocked Transnationalism 
 
In the elaboration of the political dimension of transnationalism, the significance of policy and law 
by nation-states in the creation of the transnational social space of its diaspora was already 
discussed briefly. A context in which the diaspora is denied the opportunity to materialize their 
transnational identity in cross-border linkages, through government policies and laws on both 
sides is discussed by Portes and Rumbaut as ‘blocked transnationalism’. With this concept they 
argue that: 
 
the political and social realities on the ground prevent the interest and concern with the 
home country to be translated into an effective presence. (2014: 209) 
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Traditional migration theory ignored the role of the state concerning its population and the 
receiving society until the mid-1980s (Zolberg, 1981; Pedraza, 1985: 6). Nation-states bear the 
responsibility of enacting migration policies that regulate entry and repatriation, resettlement 
and how to deal with illegal immigrants (Kivisto and Faist, 2009: 195). Ong argues that: 
 
Along with its juridical-legislative systems, bureaucratic apparatuses, economic entities, 
modes of governmentality, and war-making capacities – [the nation-state] continues to 
define, discipline, control and regulate all kinds of populations, whether in movement or 
in residence. (Ong, 1999:15) 
 
In 1985 one study acknowledged the need to include social structures whereby migration occurs. 
Pedraza argued that in addition to the individual framework, the situation of individuals, their 
tendency to move, and the basis of their decisions, we also ‘need to consider the larger social 
structures within which that plight exists and those decisions are made’ (1985: 7). Similarly, the 
existence of a transnational space is argued to be dependent on constraints and opportunities in 
the localities in which transmigrants find themselves. 
 
Community institutions and norms, and governments through their policies, laws and 
discourse, may shape the nature and extent of cross-border bonding, bases of reciprocity, 
and trust, even among family members. The more supportive the milieu, the stronger and 
more benefit-generating cross-border ties are likely to be. (Eckstein, 2010: 1652) 
 
To be engaged in transnationalism, migrants need to be localized in two or more places and to 
stay mobile they need to build local ties and be entrenched in specific localities. Cultural, 
socioeconomic and political frameworks can work restrictively on migrants’ mobility and locality, 
and therefore influence transnational behaviour and motivations. Hence, Dahinden argues that 
the creation and activism of the transnational social space depends on the social, political and legal 
factors in the ‘host’ country and the homeland (2010: 52). 
 In the case of an exile community, where a relational structure of the diaspora, the 
homeland government and the host country’s administration is established, Pedraza positioned 
herself on the ‘impossible triangle’ by Stéphane Dufoix: 
 
because it is impossible for the host state to recognize the exiles within—to tolerate them 
or encourage them, thus legitimizing their existence and their political goal—and at the 
same time to pursue diplomatic relations with the home state. The host state has to side 
with the one or with the other, but cannot side with both at once. (Pedraza, 2016: 279) 
 
The general political stance of the diaspora tends to be linear and oppositional to the regime that 
forced them to leave their homeland. This stance is expected to remain unless the native hostility 
in the host country stimulates a ‘reactive formation process’. Blocked transnationalism is argued 
to diminish over generations of refugees. But as long as the impossible triangle remains, exiles are 
observed with great distrust and uncertainty by the home regime, creating a context of espionage 
and (counter)intelligence. Collaborators are seen as traitors, while exiles feel betrayed when the 
‘host’ country engages with the homeland, or that relationship gains importance. Exile politics 
oscillate between ‘war’ – seeking to overthrow the government in the home country, and ‘politics’ 
– bargaining, compromise and negotiation, and in the case of an actual war the impossible triangle 
fade as the ‘host’ country aligns with the exiles in opposition to the government of the country of 
origin. Citizenship acquisition in the host country is determined by the degree of blocked 
transnationalism. Portes and Rumbaut claim that higher rates of citizenship acquisition are shown 
among refugees and asylums that cannot go back to their homeland. Although migration does not 
necessarily mean denationalization, this policy can be used by totalitarian regimes to remove the 
migrant’s citizen rights and leaving a person without the protection and representation of a 
government (2014: 208-211; Pedraza; 2016: 281-282; Faist, 1998: 217; Arendt, 1973: 269).   
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Chapter 2  
Living in Between Two Worlds:  
The Cuban-American Community in Miami 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter creates the context for the empirical study to analyse differences in transnational 
identity among the various generations, cohorts and migration waves of the Cuban-American exile 
community in Miami. The first part will expose Cuba’s exceptional position in the Western 
Hemisphere ever since the Spanish conquest of the New World, and its (geo)political importance 
for the United States, especially during the Cold War. A historically grounded analysis of the Cuban 
Revolution on 1 January 1959 will then be elaborated, and I will identify the most salient 
characteristics of the various generations, cohorts and migration waves that have blended into 
the CAC in Miami, over the time of the Cuban Revolution. By analysing their demographics, I 
especially underline their rationales for migration and their transnational identity with respect to 
Cuba. But as some scholars have argued, the individual or collective level is insufficient to 
understand migration and transnationalism. Thus, I will analyse the (geo)political and economic 
context of the respective migration waves as migration and transnational policies conducted by  
the Cuban and US government to create or block migration. In the analysis, the shifting 
demographics and evolution of the transnational identity regarding Cuba will explain the 
normalization process initiated by President Raúl Castro and Barack Obama, which has created 
migration and transnational policies that construct a transnational social space on the ruins of the 
Cold War, similar to that of other migrant communities in the US. 
 
2.1 Cuban Exceptionalism and the Relationship Between Cuba and the United States 
 
From the Spanish Conquista of the New World until the present day, Cuba has been a key player 
in hemispheric and global relations. During the Spanish Empire, Cuba was the last important hub 
for Spanish ships filled with richness of the Americas before they returned to the Old World. Cuban 
exceptionalism was found in its central geographical location where the Gulf Stream would guide 
ships out of the Florida Strait and back to Spain. Two hundred years later, Cuban Balseros or 
rafters would use that same current to seek better opportunities in the United States. The Florida 
Straits was the fulcrum of a great Cuban exodus that turned out to be a marker for Cuban-
American transnational identity today. Eckstein and Barberia argue that: 
 
Cuban-American homeland ties must be understood in the context of Cuba-US 
immigration history. Emigration rates have varied with US law, Castro’s tolerance and 
encouragement of emigration, and ordinary Cuban informal covert efforts to leave. (2008: 
267) 
 
Within the historical context of hemispheric relations between the United States and Latin 
America, Cuba’s role is exceptional because it is: 1) the Latin American country that is most 
affected by the Monroe Doctrine;3 2) isolated from its Latin American neighbours because of US 
foreign policy and the economic embargo;4 3) the only country in the hemisphere with a 
                                                          
3 A US statement that proclaimed zero tolerance towards any European interference in the Western Hemisphere. The 
doctrine evolved as an instrument to enhance US influence in Latin America (Hillman and D’Agostino, 2011: 193). 
4 Initiated as an arms embargo imposed during the Batista regime in March 1958 after increasing repression and 
violation of human rights on the island, became a US government attempt to isolate Cuba from the non-communist 
world and destroy Cuba’s economy, after Cuba expropriated US property on the island. President Eisenhower reduced 
the sugar quota which had been leading the Cuban export economy for decades, and blocked all US export products to 
Cuba, except for food and medicine. This proved to be counterproductive; as Castro tried to retain political power, anti-
American rhetoric fuelled by the embargo was implemented, and was an incentive that led him towards the Soviet 
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communist regime; and 4) the only country in the western hemisphere with a diaspora without 
‘normative’ transnational relations. All of the Cuban migration waves during the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries were due to political circumstances in Cuba (Grenier and Pérez, 2003: 16, 29-
31; Sweig, 2009: 6-10). 
 
2.1.1 The fuel that sparked the revolutionary spirit in Cuba 
 
The troublesome US-Cuba relations were first established by US Secretary of State John Adams in 
1823, who called Cuba and Puerto Rico ‘natural appendages of the North American continent’ 
(Sweig, 2009: 4). The United States executed foreign policy that sparked Cuba’s desire for its 
independence from Spain. The consequence was that Uncle Sam5 acquired both islands during the 
Spanish American war in 1898 which lasted three months, and ended four centuries of Spanish 
rule in the Americas. Among others, Cuban poet, political thinker and organizer José Martí, 
initiated this struggle for Cuban independence; he strongly opposed the imperialist and 
expansionist drift of the United States, perceived Cuba-US relations as David vs. Goliath, and 
foresaw a leading role for Cuba in hemispheric relations. Martí would die in his first battle for a 
Cuba libre, but the veil of his nationalist and patriotic ideology prevails on both sides of the Florida 
Straits even today. After the Spanish American war in 1898, the United States ruled Cuba until 
1902. The island became a US protectorate until 1934 because of the Platt amendment.6 During 
the great depression of the 1930s, a popular uprising called for a revolution and the restoration 
of democracy, and ousted dictator Machado. A residue of that opposition to military and political 
subjugation, and the failure of the revolutionary forces in 1933 would determine Cuba’s future. 
When in 1952, the popular elected President Carlos Prío Socarrás planned to cleanse the military 
from corruption, General Batista undertook a coup d’état (2009:7-9; Nackerud et al., 1999: 182; 
Wiarda and Kline, 2014: 341-342; Staten, 2003: 62-69). 
The 1954 one-candidate election gave him 87 per cent of the popular vote. His unjust rise 
to power made him unpopular in Cuba, but was rationalized by the Secretary of the Treasury of 
the United States at the National Security Council: 
 
[We should] stop talking so much about democracy, and make it clear that we are quite 
willing to support dictatorships of the right if their policies are pro-American. (Shoultz, 
2009: 55) 
 
It clarified that the US foreign policy rationale of promoting democracy could be thrown 
overboard when it served US interests. By the 1950s Cuba had become an corrupt investors’ 
paradise; hotels, casinos and brothels shaped Havana and the abundance of American tourists 
made the industry boom (Shoultz, 2009: 55; Merrill, 2009: 106). Batista’s Cuba was a bastion for 
anti-Communism, and an ally of the United States. Repression and exploitation of the Cuban 
people replenished the nationalist and revolutionary sentiments that had pervaded Cuba during 
the 1930s. Beginning in 1956, Fidel Castro led his revolutionary 26th of July Movement from out 
of the Sierra Maestra, strengthened by Martí’s ideology of untangling Cuba from neo-colonial 
dependence on the United States. Batista scaled up repression on the Cuban population, which 
resulted in his losing the support of his closest ally, the United States. On 1 January 1959, Batista 
                                                          
Union. The embargo can only be fully lifted through the US congress, and is unlikely to happen because of the Republican 
majority that fiercely opposes any concession towards the Castro regime (Morley, 1987: 58-60; Schoultz, 2009: 200; 
Hershberg and Dolezal, 2016: 89; Luxenberg, 1988: 51, 55). 
5A commonly used reference to the United States – by some in a derogatory way - originated from a government 
inspector during the US Civil War of 1812, who went by the name of Samuel Wilson, among his workers known as ‘Uncle 
Sam’. When the workers saw his initials ‘US’ on the supplies he had inspected for the government, they would assume 
he meant Uncle Sam, although he meant the United States (Schauffler, 1912: 145-146). 
6 The Cuban constitution allowed the United States to intervene in Cuba’s internal affairs to protect their own interests 
by any means. The amendment was abolished in 1934 (Hillman and D’Agostino, 2011: 195-196). 
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fled into exile in the Dominican Republic (Hillman and D‘Agostino, 2011: 80; Nackerud et al., 1999: 
183). 
 
2.2 The Cuban Revolution and the Creation of the Cuban-American Community in Miami 
 
The Cuban Revolution added a new chapter to Cuba’s exceptionalism. The Cold War was a 
historical period wherein ‘West [the United States and Capitalism] and East [the Soviet Union and 
Communism] contested the superiority of their political and economic systems’ (Pedraza, 1985: 
7). The implementation of an authoritarian political- and state-led economic system based upon 
communist principles, was unknown in Latin America. Cuba’s alliance with the Soviet Union – 
Cuba’s patron until the fall of the Berlin Wall – only 90 miles off North American shores made Cuba 
a national security risk and important in the bilateral relationship of the two world powers. 
Grenier and Pérez emphasized this role by arguing that ‘the closest the world has come to nuclear 
war was over Cuba [in October 1962]’. The Cuban Revolution caused Cubans to flee to the United 
States. In the first 20 years of the revolution, nearly a million Cubans fled the island (2003: 33; 
Pedraza-Bailey, 1985: 4-7, 21-22; McGillion and Morley, 2005: 12-13). Political antagonism fed 
the binational relationship: 
 
it became the policy of the United States to discredit the Cuban government ideologically 
by allowing Cubans the opportunity to choose capitalism and democracy over communism 
and dictatorship. This open-door policy towards Cubans served as an important aspect of 
the US propaganda war against communism. It also helped undermine Castro's 
government by draining Cuba of its human capital. (Hughes and Alum, 2011: 195) 
 
The US foreign policy also sought to isolate Cuba in the Western Hemisphere. Through the 
Organization of American States (OAS) it expelled Cuba in 1962 as a member and in 1964 it 
demanded members break bilateral relations to impose a collective trade embargo; this embargo 
excluded humanitarian goods. The embargo was seen as a success because of communist 
revolutions until 1979. When in 1975 the ‘red’ threat in the southern hemisphere had weakened, 
the mandatory embargo was lifted (Leogrande, 2015: 480; Rathbone et al.], 2013: 1076). 
The ideological antagonism of the Cold War created an migration framework that was 
regulated by Cuban and US government policies. Four massive migration waves to the United 
States occurred: (1) the early exiles, 1959-1962; (2) the ‘airlift’ from 1965-1973; (3) Mariel 
(1980); and (4) the 1994 ‘rafters’. During the Eleventh Conference on Cuban and Cuban-American 
Studies at Florida International University, Pedraza argued the existence of a fifth Cuban 
migration wave: Los Caminantes, 2006-2016 (personal attendance at the conference, July 24th 
2017). Overall, the Cuban migration is characterized by an ‘inverse correlation between date of 
departure and social class of the immigrants’ (Pedraza; 1985: 9). Like the vintages Kunz 
distinguished among political refugees, Cuban migrations waves are distinguished by variables 
including timing, length and intensity. Eckstein and Barberia divide the Cuban migration waves 
into two apparent cohorts based on the following characteristics: (1) social and economic 
background; (2) pre-emigration experiences (3) the possibilities for resettlement in the United 
States. Based upon these characteristics, Cuban migration since the Cuban Revolution has created 
two mayor cohorts: political refugees and economic migrants (2002: 801; Grenier and Pérez, 
2003: 22-23). 
Vertovec emphasized the juxtaposition of transnationalism and identity based on common 
grounds relating to the nation-state (2001: 473) while Grenier and Pérez argued that Cuba’s 
exceptionalism is part of that identity. It has created a strong sense of nationalism among Cuban 
on the island and in the US that is explicitly related to the nation of origin. Cubans had already 
thought of a Cuban identity or Cubanidad7 two centuries before the Cuban state was founded. In 
the United States, Cubans reject any label of assimilation as pertaining to a hyphenated or pan-
                                                          
7 A term used to indicate ‘the all-inclusive national identity that at its very roots serves as the generic condition of the 
Cuban’ (Aja, 2016: 62). 
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ethnic identity (2003: 34). Fernandez has formulated the main markers of influence that 
constitute Cuban cultural identity in Miami in the historical context of Cuba’s exceptionalism and 
the Cuban Revolution: 1) The political and ideological context, on the island and in the United 
States was significant in the formation of the American-Cuban community in Miami, and the 
relations with Cuba. This has been an acute form of disruption, and until today, for many, 
transnational relations with the country are unnegotiable; 2) the policies of the US government 
regarding Cuban immigrants have underpinned the differences with other Hispanic immigrant 
groups and stimulated the perseverance of their political ideology; 3) socioeconomic resources 
created by Cuban Americans, which facilitated cultural and linguistic expressions, are deeply 
entrenched in the community; 4) the constant migrant flow to the United States functions as an 
element of renovation and actualization of Cuban culture in the community; and 5) the 
organization of Cuban families in Miami, have facilitated the social and conservational cultural 
identity of Cuba and its transmission to the new generations (2000: 81-83). All the historical 
components are analysed on the basis of Cuban migration cohorts and waves in the rest of this 
chapter. 
 Cuba’s exceptionalism created five decades of Cuban migration to the US which constitutes 
15 per cent of the total population of Cuban descent in Cuba and the United States.8 Almost half 
live in Miami-Dade County. In 2010 Cubans were the largest Hispanic group residing in Miami-
Dade County, 34.3 per cent. As certain scholars have noted, inclusion of variables like gender, age, 
social class and ethnicity is important for understanding generational and cohort differences. The 
following table elaborates these variables related to the CAC in Miami-Dade County.  
 
 2010 2011 2015  
Gender     
Male   49,3%  
Female   50,7%  
Age     
Under 25    24,1%  
25-54   42,6%  
55+   33,2%  
Educational level     
High school degree  56,1%   
College or associate degree  21,3%   
At least a Bachelor’s degree  22,7%   
Race     
White 85,4%    
Black  4,6%    
Mixed race 3,7%    
Native Country   Cuba United States 
Miami-Dade County   70,9% 29,1% 
Entered before 2000   56,7%  
Entered after 2000   43,3%  
 
 Source: US Census bureau, 2015; Ennis et al., 2010; Department of Planning and Zoning, 2011. 
 
2.2.1 Post-Revolutionary ‘political refugees’ 
 
After the Cuban Revolution, the first migrant wave of ‘early exiles’ was from Cuba’s upper and 
middle class. The Castro regime applauded this post-revolutionary migration wave to free itself 
from political opposition. The second big migration wave came in 1965 when the economic 
                                                          
8 The US Census bureau estimated the Cuban population in the US in 2015 at 2,106,501, while Worldometers estimated 
the population of Cuba in that same year as 11,389,562 (US Census bureau, 2015; Worldometers, n.d.) 
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embargo severely weakened the material and political situation in Cuba, and pressured Castro to 
get rid of the discontented; anyone who wanted to leave could. An emigration programme of 
‘Freedom flights’ was initiated with the US where President Johnson welcomed them with open 
arms. This migration accord was the first diplomatic consensus between the two countries since 
the Cuban Revolution (Zolberg, 2008: 326; Leogrand, and Kornbluh, 2014: 107). Until the Mariel 
Boatlift in 1980, around 770,000 Cubans arrived in the United States, where the majority came to 
Miami. Cuban migrants were later dispersed throughout the United States through resettlement 
programmes to relieve Miami from the immense migratory pressure (Perez, 1986: 129-131). 
Drawn from the theory of Kunz, the first wave (1959-1962) proved to be an acute refugee 
movement after the Cuban Revolution. The ‘political refugees’ were firm owners, big merchants, 
sugar mill owners, cattlemen, representatives of foreign companies, and professionals who left 
Cuba when the old social order was overturned involving the nationalization of American industry 
and agrarian reform laws occurred; between 1960 and 1964, around 172,919 Cubans arrived. It 
was dominated by woman and children as they are privileged to leave first. The ‘Freedom flights’ 
(1965-1973) were characterized by family reunification, and contained more middle- and 
working class individuals: employees, craftsmen, small merchants, skilled and semiskilled 
workers. It was an anticipatory refugee movement because it was regulated by both governments. 
Changing societal structures, the US embargo, the ‘brain drain’ of the first wave and failure of the 
sugar monoculture made Cuba migration already less political and more economically motivated, 
although their desire to leave was politically condemned. These Cubans rejected communism and 
feared persecution, imprisonment, torture or even death. The total first cohort was predominantly 
white, devoted Catholics, educated, well-off citizens and aligned with US interests on the island. 
They perceived migration as temporary because Washington would not allow a communist 
regime in Cuba in the wake of the Cold War (Pedraza-Bailey, 1985: 10; Pedraza 2007: 3-6, 26–27). 
Families feared indoctrination of their children by a communist ideology, mainly because 
of the nationalization of private schools. Between 1960 and 1962, around 14,000 children were 
sent, with support of the Catholic church, but without their parents to the United States on a 
student visa; this was called ‘Operation Pedro Pan’. Eckstein and Barberia argue that these first-
wave Cuban-born children distorted from the political stance of their parents towards Cuba, hence 
also in transnational identity. Although some were committed to the anti-Castro ideology, many 
broke the travel boycott of their parents and the CAC to connect their past with the present (2002: 
824; Eire, 2003; Grenier and Pérez, 2003: 23). 
 Between 1959 and 1995, US refugee policy towards Cuba was defined by an anti-
communist political agenda. The first wave of Cuban exiles had great symbolic and ideological 
value within the ‘Cold War arsenal’ of the United States and thus were received with open arms. 
They became the figurehead through which US foreign policy was conducted, but: 
 
Cuban-Americans did not begin to exert a significant influence on the US Cuba policy until 
after 1980. Prior to that time, the establishment and continuation of a hostile policy 
towards Cuba resided exclusively in Washington, with exiles playing a merely supportive 
role, as exemplified by the failed 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion. (Grenier: 2003: 90) 
 
 After the failed Bay of Pigs operation, it became clear that the Cuban exiles were to stay, and 
therefore the US government started organizing resettlement (Torres, 2014: 69-72). The 
Migration and Assistance Act of 1962 facilitated their entry through ‘open-door’ policies via 
refugee, parole or special entrant status, and they received federal support for resettlement: job 
training, education, housing, medical care, and social welfare benefits. This exceptional treatment 
contrasted with refugee groups from other nations coming to the United States. The Cuban 
Adjustment Act (CAA) of 1966 emphasized these ‘Cuban special immigration privileges’ by 
assuring Cubans of permanent residence after staying in the United States for one year. The US 
congress justified this law by reasoning that it would: 
 
(1) ease the administrative burden of Cuban exiles who wanted to become legal 
permanent residents; (2) integrate Cuban exiles into the American workforce; and (3) 
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provide refuge to victims of communist persecution... the CAA also served to further US 
efforts in the ideological war against communism. (Hughes and Alum, 2011: 196) 
 
After resettlement the socioeconomic and entrepreneurial success, skills, attitude and political 
influence in US foreign policy labelled this first cohort of Cuban Americans as the ‘Golden Exiles’ 
(Portes, 1969). They became the ‘builders of the new Miami’ (Portes and Puhrman, 2015: 41). 
Duany argues that the economic successes were created by: 
 
the privileged class origins of early Cuban migrants, leading to the creation of an enclave 
economy in Miami; the definition of Cuban exiles as political refugees by the US 
government; and the unusually high participation of Cuban women in the US labor force. 
(Duany, 1999) 
 
It has facilitated their adjustment to an American way of life and a protracted political and 
economic authority within the CAC in Miami. According to the assimilation theory by Berg and 
Eckstein (2015), this first cohort assimilated well into American society, while preserving their 
Cuban identity. Grenier and Pérez argue that these exiles felt compelled to flee as they had lost 
Cuba’s internal class conflict, and so they have been ‘standard-bearers’ of the exile legacy and the 
struggle against the Castro regime (2003: 23; Nackerud et al.], 1999: 177; Hughes and Alum, 2011: 
188). 
 A series of policies were institutionalized and enforced by the Cuban government to 
guarantee national security. Cuban exiles were characterized as traitors or ‘gusanos’ to the 
Revolution. The Cuban constitution determined that Cuban citizenship is lost by becoming a 
citizen of a foreign country, and holding dual citizenship is not allowed. Returning to Cuba meant 
renouncing the other country’s citizenship and applying for reinstatement of Cuban citizenship 
(Travieso-Díaz, 1998: 81-82). Cuban exiles were denied visitation rights and could only maintain 
low level contact with friends and kin in Cuba. The hardship of re-entering the island made Cuban 
exiles nonpersons in their own country. Fidel Castro used the exile community abroad as 
ideological fuel to light up the revolutionary spirit because it posed a counterrevolutionary threat, 
e.g. through the Bay of Pigs and assistance to the numerous assassination plots of the US 
government.9 Castro created and expanded institutions to enlarge popular support for the 
revolution. At the same time, the massive Cuban exodus presented a depletion of human capital 
and questioned the legitimacy of a revolution that was supposed to be nationalistic (Eckstein and 
Barberia, 2002: 802; Torres, 2014: 52-60). 
Since the notion of exile plays such a powerful role in the identity and politics of Cuban 
Americans, Torres argues that it requires close examination; the idea of exile is the glue that holds 
together the political memory of the CAC. The ‘exile ideology’ made the CAC an unambiguous 
community. It was the collective struggle against Castro and political organizations in opposition 
to the regime, who had not only apprehended their country but also their lives; this made it a 
personal struggle (Torres, 2014: 37, 76). These ‘first wavers’ proclaimed themselves to be 
‘political refugees’ in their rejection of communism. Research undertaken in 1963 among the first 
group of Cuban exiles in Miami concluded that: 
 
the decision to leave was primarily based on personal experiences and pragmatic factors 
[that] carried more weight than ideological ones in the ultimate decision although the 
reverse was true for the initial thoughts of leaving. Timing of the decision to leave was 
inversely related to participation in the anti-Batista struggle and to initial attitude towards 
the Revolution (...). (Casal and Hernandez, 1975: 26) 
 
As the demographics of the Cuban-American exile population changed over time, their reasons to 
migrate change as well. By the 1970s immigrant reasoning was based upon economic scarcities, 
rather than principles or personal security. In this research Wong stresses that: 
                                                          
9 For more detail on the assassination attempts on Fidel Castro, see (Schoultz, 2009). 
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 the true political refugees may be those who left Cuba in a second stage, this is to say, 
between the abortive Bay of Pigs10 and the 1962 Missile Crisis,11 while later immigrants 
resemble more traditional immigrants in class origins and motivations. (1975: 27) 
 
Under the Refugee Act of 1980, Cuban migration was legally restricted in the US to 19,500 Cubans 
a year, and only Cubans who could meet the international definition of a ‘political refugee’ – 
individuals subject to ‘a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, 
membership social group, or political’ – would be granted refugee status (Nackerud et al., 1999: 
181). Although categorized as ‘political exiles’, according to Casal and Hernandez, immigrants 
from the 1970s already did not meet the international definition as ‘political refugees’ but came 
to the United States in search of a better economic future. This has defined their political stance 
and transnational identity towards Cuba ever since (Casal and Hernandez, 1975: 26-27; Eckstein 
and Barberia, 2002: 801-802). 
  
2.2.2 The Cuban ‘economic’ immigrants since the Mariel Boatlift 
 
In 1980 a third significant wave of Cuban immigrants came to the United States. Cuban migration 
from the 1980s onwards was typified as different from the first cohort of ‘political refugees’. 
Castro invited Cubans in Miami to the port of Mariel to pick up anyone who had the desire to leave 
the island. Like the 1994 Balseros coming from a crisis, Pedraza argued it was an acute refugee 
movement (2007: 7-8). As the exile community organized the pickup of Cubans at Mariel, Ronald 
Reagan used the boatlift in his presidential election campaign among Cuban-Americans, and 
forced US President Carter – wary at first – to organize a ‘warm welcome’ (Zolberg, 2008: 349). A 
wide variety of 125,000 Cubans crossed the Florida Straits in a period of five months: 
 
ranging from intellectuals, artists, and homosexuals, to long-time disaffected who for one 
reason or another previously had been unable to leave, to criminals and mental patients 
the government loaded on to boats picking islanders up. (Eckstein, 2004: 13) 
 
Grenier and Pérez argue that the Mariel Boatlift was a good demographic representation of the 
Cuban population on the island. Miami’s mayor formulated the Mariel Boatlift by saying that ‘Fidel 
has just flushed his toilet on us’ (Sweig, 2009: 97-98). This migration wave comprised the lower 
socioeconomic sector and the non-white population; youthful, 70 per cent were blue-collar 
workers, but there were also a significant amount of intellectuals – due to lack of freedom of 
expression. The flow of Marielitos12 raised the Afro-Cuban population within the CAC from 3 to 5 
per cent (Pedraza, 2007: 7-8; Rytz, 2013: 122). Cuban rhetoric from the island and the media 
enlarged ‘bad news’ which created negative connotations for Cuban Americans in the United 
States: 
 
The [Cuban] exiles ceased to be a ‘model minority’ and the ‘builders of the new Miami’ to 
become just another third-world minority forcing its way onto American shores. (Portes 
and Puhrman, 2015: 41) 
 
The Mariel Boatlift was the last convulsion of ‘open arm’ policies towards Cuban migration. In the 
United States, the perception of Cuban migration changed and as a consequence Marielitos were 
denied permanent settlement by an official statement and labelled a new legal category: ‘entrants, 
                                                          
10 A brigade of Cuban exiles who were trained by US tried to oust the Castro regime in April 1961, but failed miserably 
(Hillman and D’Agostino, 2011: 80). 
11 The possibility of a major Cold War confrontation revealed Soviet missiles were placed on the island. An agreement 
between the US and the Soviet Union ended the precarious situation (2011: 81). 
12 Marielito became the derogatory term to indicate the migrants of the Mariel Boatlift, that had stigmatized the 
reputation of the ‘Golden exiles’ and the Cuban-American community (Portes and Puhrmann, 2015: 41). 
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status pending’. They became denationalized (Grenier and Pérez, 2003: 24-27; Portes and 
Puhrman, 2015: 41). 
  The failure of Cold War communism destroyed the impossible triangle wherein Cuba was 
situated, and left it to confront the United States alone. When the Communist threat vanished after 
1989, a first blow to the legitimacy of the embargo and the Cuban-American right-wing policy was 
given. Nonetheless, the US maintained an antagonistic stance under the rationale of ‘promoting 
democracy’ – as it was not in their interest to maintain Castro (McGillion and Morley, 2005: 12-
14). Since 1989, more Cubans have come to the United States than during any other period in 
Cuba’s (Duany, 2011: 137). President Bush Sr. enforced the Cuban Democracy Act in 1992, which 
severed the economic embargo on Cuba.13 From the early 1990s on, the Cuban economy shrunk 
by US$4.3 billion dollars a year, which was 21 per cent of the annual Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) and further pushed Cuban migration to the United States during the ‘Special Period in 
Peacetime’. It created the fourth big migration wave of the Cuban Balseros in 1994. Eckstein calls 
Cuban migration of the post-Soviet era ‘a family project’: 
 
strategized to send their most employable family members abroad, young adults, on the 
assumption that those leaving, unlike in the past, would maintain homeland ties and 
income-share. Cubans accordingly cultivated the creation of new diasporic ties. They did 
not merely rely on ties of old. (2009: 185) 
 
This time, Castro knew that Cuban Americans weren’t going to pick up Cubans. Cuban migration 
policy motivated Cubans to float to the US on homemade rafts; 37,194 Balseros or rafters were 
intercepted on the Strait of Florida in 1994 and brought to Guantánamo Bay14 to await the asylum 
procedure (Eckstein and Barberia, 2002: 801; Gershman and Gutierrez Rozo, 2009: 36-37; 
Zolberg, 2008: 384). 
 
2.2.3 Shaping relations: Golden Exiles and post-Mariel migrants, Miami and Cuba 
 
The influx of Cubans from the Mariel Boatlift onwards has distorted the demographics of the CAC 
in Miami. The newcomers had lived under the Castro regime since the Cuban Revolution which 
changed their view of the government. The exile ideology had held the community cohesive, but 
it was slowly changing to make ‘the first-ever social divide within the émigré community’ 
(Eckstein and Barberia, 2008: 268) and a ‘bifurcated enclave’ (Portes and Puhrmann, 2015) 
created by contrasting realities from which these migration waves stemmed; this has redefined 
the transnational identity of the CAC: 
 
... the views of Marielitos and subsequent émigrés are grounded in the complexity of life in 
contemporary Cuba, and the lives of family member there, not in an imagined and 
idealized pre-revolutionary social order. They differ here from Cuban émigrés in the first 
cohort, especially those children of first wavers who do not even know Castro’s Cuba first 
hand. Coming to the United States is mainly for pragmatic economic reasons, and not 
infrequently emigration is a family strategy, a way to earn money for kin left behind in the 
growing dollarized island economy. Recent émigrés put family first. By contrast, earlier 
émigrés, whose close relatives in the main are reunified in the United States, are well 
positioned to put politics and their personal principles first. (Eckstein and Barberia, 2008: 
270) 
 
                                                          
13 Pressured by Cuban-American lobbyists, President Bush forbid US subsidiaries outside of the US from trading with 
Cuba, to create economic and social turmoil that would motivate  Cubans  to demand political reform. It also prohibited 
ships from loading or unloading their freight in the United States if they had been to Cuban ports, and gave the President 
authorization to prevent US government assistance going to any country that supported the Cuban government 
(Rathbone et al.], 2013: 1076-1077; Wong, 1994: 651) 
14 Guantanamo Bay is a piece of land ‘leased’ by the US on the Cuban Island by the 1902 Platt Amendment (Staten, 2003: 
46-47). 
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Research has shown that especially the Cubans who came after the Mariel Exodus displayed 
strong family ties with their relatives on the island due to the geographical proximity and close 
blood ties. They built transnational bridges with relatives and community on the island, although 
Cuban and American policies didn’t allow it. Throughout the years Cuban migration and 
transnationality has started to show great similarities with other migrant diasporas: 
undocumented status, economic motivations, working class migrants, and the use of the diaspora 
as a source of income by the sending government (Duany, 2007: 166; Duany, 2011: 137-157). 
The awareness of social diversity penetrated the community and compelled the Golden 
Exiles to acquire a definition of Cuban identity in Miami, which was different in Miami after the 
Mariel Boatlift. After the Cuban Revolution, the identity of exile had changed into a political 
statement. The first Golden Exiles perceived themselves as the ‘real’ political immigrants in Miami 
which made them feel superior to the post-Mariel migrants. The influx of Post-Marielitos reminded 
the older cohorts that Cuban culture on and off the island differed from each other. After Mariel, 
political activism remained in the ‘old enclave’, as they had gained large political and economic 
wealth. Post-Mariel migrants grew up in an culture that did not made them aware and able to 
express their political voice; they could choose between ‘loyalty’ and leaving. The Cuban-American 
hardliners intimidated, attacked and excluded those Cuban Americans who exposed a more 
progressive and transnational posture towards the Castro regime; integration within the 
privileged ‘old’ community was constrained for the Marielitos and subsequent cohorts. Exile 
politics took on an authoritarian style within the Cuban community in Miami, which was similar 
to the Castro regime. Although terrorist groups were declining, during the 1980s Miami had the 
highest number of bombing incidents and political assassinations in the US. Using all means, until 
the end of the 1990s the political ‘exile’ ideology appeared homogeneous to the outside world 
(Pedraza, 2016: 277-278; Portes and Mozo, 1985: 55; Torres, 2014: 79-87, 142; Duany, 2011: 137-
157). 
At the beginning of the 1990s, the end of the Cold War marked a moment of merging 
cohorts within the community in Miami. Cubanidad proved strong enough to get different 
migrations’ waves and political groups together to discuss scenarios for a post-Cold War Cuba. 
Another sign of merging relations within the community was expressed when in 1997 Cuban 
American National Foundation (CANF) founder and figurehead of the Cuban-American opposition 
against Castro, Jorgé Mas Canosa, died. Afterwards, his son Jorgé Mas Santos reformed the CANF 
to represent the entire CAC with a more progressive political stance towards Cuba, e.g. the CANF 
denounced cutting remittances and direct flights to Cuba, policies that were announced by 
President Bush in 2003. Support for the CANF’s new course became visible during research in 
2004 which concluded that almost half of the Cuban Americans in Miami favoured unrestricted 
travel, although the majority still supported the embargo (McGillion, and Morley, 2005: 17-18; 
Rytz, 2013: 124; Duany, 2007: 166). 
 
2.2.4 A new generation of American-Born Cubans (ABCs) 
 
The burden of the severely politicized history of the CAC in Miami, and with it the opposition to 
‘normative’ transnational ties has influenced the socialization into a political identity of the ABCs, 
and influences the creation of a transnational identity towards Cuba as their Cuban identity is not 
the lived experience of a common identity linked to a particular place. The rigorous preservation 
of Cuban culture, political and ideological factors, and economic successes have played a decisive 
factor in the cohesion of the CAC in Miami. The ‘exile ideology’ of the community has significantly 
influenced the ABC’s socialization process by means of family, the educational institutions, 
political and social organizations, and to a lesser degree the means of communication. Fernandez 
argues that it is important to analyse the notion of ‘exile’ and how this is entrenched into the US-
born Cuban generation. She concludes that the second generation has considered itself as 
emigrants more than being in exile in the United States. Portes argues that: 
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The politics of the second and subsequent generations has been overwhelmingly 
American, as are the values and loyalties of their members. (Portes, 2014: 213) 
 
This collides with Torres’ presumption from a assimilationist perspective that political 
socialization of the second generation is more and more focused on the new country (Torres: 
2014:33). The exile ideology of their (grand)parents and the anti-Castro dogma becomes less 
significant in this political process, and Fernandez argues that there has been a high degree of 
acculturation outside the CAC to US society, e.g. there is a preference for the English language 
among Cuban youngsters (Fernandez, 2000: 81-82). 
 The second-generation Cuban Americans constantly live between two worlds. There is the 
‘Cuban’ world of the family and the community: Spanish speaking grandparents and parents, 
Cuban culture and the heritage of family life in Cuba, and the American world outside these 
frames: speaking English with friends, work or study, and the social and cultural characteristics 
of American society. Generations that have been born in Cuba look towards the past, present and 
future out of their point of reference, which is Cuba while the ABCs perceive the world around 
them from their frame of reference – the United States. Fernandez argues that these different 
lenses are capable of creating inter-generational conflicts caused by: 1) the bifurcation of who 
they are and who the community and their family want them to be. For a long time being a good 
Cuban was to adhere to the exile ideology, but the second generation is likely to have changed 
that; 2) the affective dimension in terms of pride and the psychological meanings pertaining to the 
Cuban community. But at the same time the second generation displays considerable affection 
towards the United States, which is recognized as part of their identity; and 3) conflicts associated 
with aspirations, life projects, necessities and interests that exist within the US-born generations, 
which are a logical result of the generational transitions. The second-generation experiences the 
past of their parents on a different level in terms of value and emotions, because this past is not 
part of their own lived experience. Some of the ABCs are expected to conform to an illusionary 
Cuban identity, created by the first generation based on their own political identity, i.e. the ‘exile 
ideology’. But the second generation can never live up to these expectations and rejects any 
imposed political identity (2000: 86-88). 
  
2.3 The Impossible Triangle and transnationalism since the Cuban Revolution 
 
Besides the decisive role of migration policies in the contemporary demographics and 
transnational identity of the CAC in Miami, this section will further elaborate US and Cuban 
government policies on the creation or blockage of transnational linkages between Cubans and 
Cuban Americans since the Cuban Revolution, to analyse the concept of Cuban ‘blocked 
transnationalism’ while bearing in mind the interplay of the geopolitical and economic context, 
and the shifting demographics of the CAC in Miami. Eckstein argues that: 
 
State and community structures, norms, and informal social pressures all kept 
transnational ties to a minimum and a negative asset during Castro’s first three decades of 
rule, between 1959 and 1989, years during which 7 per cent of the Cuban population 
emigrated to the US. Barriers emanated from both sides of the Florida Straits. (2010: 1652) 
 
In 2006, a survey concluded that transnational practices of Cuban Americans in the United States 
consolidated over time and were characterized by travelling and sending remittances to Cuba, 
followed by telephone calls, property ownership and belonging to an ethnic organization. Duany 
argues that Cuban transnationalism faces more legal, political and economic barriers than other 
Latino groups in the United States, and therefore demonstrates fewer transnational linkages. 
Especially since the economic hardship that troubled Cuba between 1989 and 1994, cultural, 
familial and emotional transnational bridges have been cemented. Even during the return to the 
hardline and antagonistic policies of the Bush administration, Cuban Americans travelled and sent 
remittances to Cuba through third countries (Duany, 2011: 150; Portes and Puhrmann, 2015: 46). 
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Though the economic embargo of the 1960s does not ban travel itself, under the Cuban 
Assets Control Regulations (CACR) (1963-1977) restrictions were placed on financial 
transactions related to travel to Cuba and therefore travel was effectively banned. Both 
governments severed mailing and telecommunication services, although the minimal Cuban-
American desire to remit funds didn’t needed regulation from Washington. Castro’s regime was 
determined to perpetuate the revolution and therefore constrained contact with Cuban exiles, 
prohibited visits by immigrants, and penalized dollar possession. Anyone who had linkages with 
the diaspora was castigated by exclusion of the Communist party, and membership was required 
for a high level job. For Cubans these socioeconomic repercussions proved good incentives to 
abstain from maintaining linkages with Cubans abroad. Besides these policies by the Cuban 
government, there was a psychological burden to the lack of transnational activity between the 
two enclaves; Cubans grieved about family that had left them, and ended transnational ties with 
kin abroad (Sullivan, 2017: 1; Eckstein, 2010: 1652-1653). 
A secret dialogue during the Ford administration resulted in the establishment of interests 
sections in both capitals during Carter’s tenure. President Carter lifted the travel ban and family 
visits were authorized for the first time since the 1960s. In August 1977, Fidel Castro tried to 
cultivate linkages by exchanging ideas and opinions with the moderate section of the exile 
community already emerging. Castro considered Jimmy Carter to be a person of ‘high religious 
and moral principles’ and thought that empowering the more moderate exiles would strengthen 
him to change the hostility of US foreign policy towards Cuba. The dialogue resulted in releasing 
3,000 political prisoners from Cuba and even discussed compensation of expropriated property 
in Cuba. It was the biggest gesture ever made by Fidel Castro towards the US and the exile 
community. In 1979, Castro allowed 100,000 Cuban Americans to visit the island (Zolberg, 2008: 
349; Leogrande and Kornbluh, 2014: 5, 180-183). The Cuban government reduced Cuban-
American visits again after the Mariel Boatlift crisis, and mail services were precarious. Cuba 
restricted entry of Marielitos until the end of the 1980s, and of the 1994 Balseros until 1999 
(Eckstein and Barberia, 2002: 814; Kornbluh and Blight, 1994). 
The United States was forced to tighten the screws on Cuba again in 1979, after the 
Nicaraguan and Grenadian revolutions were established, and the efforts of Jimmy Carter and 
Gerald Ford encountered an impasse over Cuba’s support to revolutionaries in Angola. When 
President Ronald Reagan was elected to the White House from 1981 to 1989, the transnational 
space was further narrowed; travel was again restricted, although travel-related transactions of 
certain travel categories were allowed. Despite their personal enmity towards Castro and 
government policies blocking transnational ties, Cuban Americans empathized with kin and 
friends in Cuba and have sent remittances ever since 1978 (McGillion and Morley, 2005: 12-15; 
Rathbone et al., 2013: 1076;). In the 1980s the Castro regime constituted a transnational 
framework of policies that welcomed hard currency from Cubans abroad. Beginning in 1982, 
Castro changed his reference of gusanos or Cuban traitors to ‘the Cuban community abroad’ 
(Blanco, 2011: 25). Eckstein and Barberia see this as part of the shifting rationale for Cuban 
migration to the US: 
 
The more Cubans emigrate for income-earning purposes, the less likely are politics to 
stand in the way of transnational family ties. For economic immigrants, visiting Castro's 
Cuba poses no moral dilemma, even if they would welcome the leader's downfall (Eckstein 
and Barberia, 2002: 815). 
 
Domestic possession of dollars became legal. The Cuban government created dollar-based 
consumer and savings possibilities and in the late 1990s became an agent of transnational hard 
currency exchange (Eckstein, 2009: 179, 185, 214-215). 
The end of the Cold War and Cuba’s economy plummeting into recession, changed the US 
rationale for its Cuba policy. On the American side, opponents of Castro thought that the right 
policies would bring the regime down. The Cuban Democracy Act, signed by President Bush in 
1992, banned travel to Cuba but promoted people-to-people contact, humanitarian assistance and 
sales of medicine. Bill Clinton improved transnational engagement. The US granted visas to Cuban 
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artists, musicians and scholars. American companies upgraded telecommunications services with 
Cuba, which had not been done since 1961, and in July of 1993, Castro eased travel restriction on 
Cuban-American visits. During the Balsero crisis, the CANF pressured President Clinton to reduce 
remittances and end charter flights. The demographic shift started appearing when these 
measures weren’t supported by all. Cuban Americans were concerned about the scarcity on the 
island affecting their kin, and opposition to Castro became subordinate. Many ignored the 
regulations, supported by upgraded mail and telephone services. Transnational linkages were 
already too well established to be easily reduced and no significant effect on hard currency in Cuba 
was produced as Cuban Americans sent it through third countries. In October 1995, Clinton 
approved the restoration of Cuban-American remittances and eased travel restrictions. President 
Clinton persisted in the enforcement of the embargo and promoted the travel of media bureaus 
and cultural organizations for humanitarian goals, to promote democracy, and to stimulate the 
Cuban desire for regime change (Leogrande and Kornbluh, 2014: 272-274, 304; McGillion and 
Morley, 2005: 15-18). 
Instead of searching for engagement, the Bush administration tried to replace the Castro 
regime, and turned to the antagonistic policies of the Reagan era. Bush’s spearhead was the 
Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba (CAFC), a committee designed to help replace the Castro 
regime, and create a democratic and free Cuba. Bush had no faith in people-to-people exchanges, 
thus curtailed travel and the flow of hard currency to Cuba. Cuban Americans could only travel to 
Cuba once every three years, and were restricted in sending remittances and goods (Leogrande 
and Kornbluh, 2014: 355; Sweig, 2009: 190). 
   
2.3.1 A new dawn of engagement on the Cold War’s ruins 
 
The Cuban and US governments have controlled Cuban migration and transnationalism for half a 
century. In 2009, President Barack Obama met his promise of opening a dialogue for the 
normalization of bilateral relations with Cuba. Obama argued that: 
 
We don’t need to a debate about whether to have a rigid, state-run economy or unbridled 
and unregulated capitalism - we need a pragmatic and responsible action that advances 
our common prosperity. (Frank, 2013: 135-140) 
 
United States’ senator Lugar declared that US policy on Cuba had failed as it had not removed 
Castro, and that the American citizen was the best ambassador to promote American ideals. 
Restrictions on Cuban-American family visits and remittances were removed and 
telecommunications with Cuba were established. Obama was pressured by other Latin American 
countries to permit Cuba membership in the OAS in April 2009. Barack Obama declared that 
Cuba’s reaction to US engagement would decide the course of bilateral relations between the two 
countries. Raúl Castro announced that Cuba was ready to seek bilateral engagement on any issue 
that needed to be addressed: human rights, political prisoners, etc., but that Cuba was not willing 
to undertake political concessions (Dominguez et al., 2012: 42-43; Frank, 2013: 122, 130-142). 
 In January 2011, Obama permitted educational and religious activities, and authorized 
people-to-people travel. US citizens were allowed to send remittances up to $500 per quarter and 
licensed remittances to religious organizations. Transnational policies were similar to policies 
during Clinton’s tenure, although Obama allowed US airports to become eligible for flights from 
and to Cuba. From 2014, Obama installed 12 categories of travel, permitted the use of US credit 
and debit cards, eliminated per diem limits, authorized general licensed travel for professional 
media or artistic productions as part of the travel category for those involved in the export, import, 
or transmission of information or informational materials, and authorized educational travel for 
individuals. Moreover, Obama lifted all the value limits of Cuban goods taken from or to Cuba and 
increased the dollar limits for so-called non-family and donor remittances to humanitarian 
projects, in support of the Cuban people and the development of private businesses. Bill Clinton 
had codified the embargo in 1996 by signing the Helms-Burton Act and therefore a total lift of 
travel restrictions required legislative action; as it is conditioned by the act of certain democratic 
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conditions in Cuba, tourist activities to Cuba are still prohibited by law (Sullivan, 2017: 1-2; 
Nackerud et al.], 1999: 189). 
The Castro regime reacted to this new rapprochement by changing restrictions on travel 
in January 2013, e.g. the tarjeta blanca15 was abolished. US authorities saw a 79 per cent increase 
of granted visas. Under the 1966 Cuban Refugee Act, Cubans are able to obtain residencia (green 
card) after staying one year in the United States, and then can leave the US for up to a year. The 
Cuban government issued travel visas up to two years out of the island, with the possibility of 
extending these foreign stays for another two years, without losing property or citizenship rights. 
These policies allow Cubans to be ‘transnational’ citizens and strengthen linkages between the 
communities. Cuba has eased travelling for Cuban-Americans. Before, the US Embassy in Havana 
warned Cuban-Americans of hostile measures by the Cuban government: e.g. impeding 
restrictions and obligations (including military services), forcing them to surrender their US 
passport, to sign declarations of repatriation or denying Cuban Americans the right to leave the 
country. ABCs were considered Cuban nationals and this gave the Cuban government rights over 
them, even if they had not applied for Cuban citizenship. Nowadays, ‘The Government of Cuba 
treats US citizens born in Cuba as Cuban citizens and may subject them to a range of restrictions 
and obligations’ (US Embassy in Cuba, May 4th, 2017; Leogrande, 2015: 484; Ackermann, 2015: 2; 
Martinez, 2016). 
Another decisive day in the historical relations between Cuba and the United States was 
17 December 2014. President Obama and Raúl Castro announced on national television the 
normalization of bilateral relations (Hershberg and Dolezal, 2016: 89). In July of 2015, after being 
closed for half a century, embassies in Havana and Washington were reopened. These institutions 
are known as instruments to institutionalize links with the diaspora, and to motivate 
transnational activities (NPR, 2015; Al-Ali et al., 2001, 590). On 12 January 2017, President Obama 
announced his last act on Cuban migration by ending the ‘wet foot, dry foot’ policy of President 
Clinton. This policy modified the 1966 Cuban Refugee Adjustment Act, and was installed during 
the rafter crisis. It returned rafters caught at sea by the US Coast Guard, but made Balseros who 
reached US soil legal residents of the United States (Leogrande and Kornbluh, 2014: 270; Caldwell 
and Pace, 2017, January 13). Although President Obama has changed US migration and 
transnational policies, the course of US foreign policy towards Cuba remains uncertain under 
President Trump. He spoke of ‘terminating the deal’ if it didn’t get a better for the Cuban people, 
Cuban Americans and the United States. With the ideological person of Fidel passing away in 
November, 2016 Raúl Castro has the exclusive right to decide what course Cuba will take 
(Vazquez, 2017). The question remains whether the path towards normalization chosen by 
Barack Obama and Raúl Castro will continue not only helping each nation to construct their part 
of the transnational bridge on the Florida Straits, but in the process also merging the colours of 
the Cuban transnational identity in Miami. 
  
                                                          
15 This was the permission that Cubans needed from the Cuban government to travel outside of the country (Leogrande, 
2015:484). 
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Chapter 3  
Rebuilding Transnational Bridges on the Florida Strait 
 
Introduction 
 
In the theoretical chapter, the contextual analysis of the transnational identity of the CAC in Miami, 
situated within the historical and contemporary relationship between the United and Cuba, has 
identified significant variables that have contributed to the contemporary transnational social 
space between Miami and Cuba. This chapter will address the variables that have created 
differences in transnational identity generations, cohorts and migrations waves of Cuban 
Americans in Miami, and how the shifting demographics and transnational identity of Miami’s CAC 
has evolved to motivate both governments to break down the ‘Cold Wall’. Furthermore, the use of 
data will underline the materialization of the Cuban-American desire to have transnational 
linkages; statistics are used to show how the shifting demographics have constituted a more 
moderate and progressive stance that favours engagements with Cuba over antagonism. In the 
summer of 2016, I conducted field research for a period of six weeks in the heart of Cuban-
American life, in Miami. I interviewed Cubans–Americans from different generations, cohorts and 
migrations waves, and professors of the various universities located in Miami to discuss the most 
significant topics of this research. I conclude that the observations made through the interviews 
cannot be generalized as being representative for certain cohorts because the research sample is 
quite modest, but the qualitative results are used to support or nuance quantitative data in the 
literature. As certain scholars have noted, inclusion of variables like gender, age, social class and 
ethnicity would strengthen the validity of the research. 
 
3.1 Changing Perceptions of the Cuban Revolution 
 
As Cubans left the island after the Cuban Revolution, they lost their citizen rights and were without 
a country. This first cohort forged an alliance with the United States against the Cuban regime. 
Washington’s policies such as the economic embargo on Cuba, support for political and military 
activism (e.g. the Bay of Pigs) and the CAA demonstrated this antagonism. Cold War contradictions 
created the existence of an ‘Impossible Triangle’ which left no desire or space for normative 
transnational ties between the two communities. But the transnational identity was constituted 
by the affective transnational ties of Cuban identity or Cubanidad16 that was entrenched in the 
Miami community. Being a Cuban exile in Miami encouraged political and military activism in 
opposition to the regime in their homeland. Post-Mariel immigrants have blended that 
transnational identity as they are more open about the creation of transnational bridges based on 
long-term commitment. They have defied the old guard and the ‘blocked’ transnational 
framework (Port and Rumbaut, 2014: 211). When I spoke to the lead investigator of the FIU Cuba 
Poll and Professor in Sociology at Florida International University, whose writings I have 
frequently used of the course of this research, Guillermo Grenier17 explained the pre-migration 
experiences of more recent arrivals: 
 
Now the [Cuban] folks that are coming, from 1995 especially, when there was a new 
migration accord between the US and Cuba, those people don’t see the revolution as this 
experiment in social engineering that has destroyed their way of life. They see it as 
something that is making life very hard, it is a tough economy... Ultimately, the Cuban 
problem is not a political problem, it is an economic problem. If you have capitalism that 
                                                          
 
 
17 Personal interview with Dr. Guillermo Grenier, 2 June 2016 at FIU, Miami, Florida. 
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works, people are happy; if you have communism that works, people are happy; socialism 
that works, people are happy. (2016) 
 
The quantity of Cuban Balseros or rafters who crossed the Florida Strait was the biggest mass 
migration the United States had to deal with up to that moment. In 1994 and 1995, new 
immigration policies18 regulated Cuban migration to the United States and were a game changer 
to the numerous demographics of the American-Cuban community in Miami. In 2015, US Census 
bureau estimated that 43.3 per cent of Cubans in Miami-Dade County came after the year 2000. 
These figures are addressed by Grenier19 during our interview on transnational identity. He 
argues that these Cubans – from Periodo Especial – are true transmigrants (ibid.; US Census 
bureau, 2015; Castro, 2013: 27). 
 The subsequent waves of Cuban migration have brought Miami a rich history. Historian 
Arva Parks describes these waves as ‘Miami’s whole history … written in short paragraphs’ 
(George, 1995: 373). I interpret this description as a reference to the diversity and complexity of 
the Cuban-American story in Miami and towards Cuba. In my interview with Andrew Gottlieb,20 
who has done qualitative field research on revolutionary societies in Cuba, and quantitative 
research on ethnic identity and assimilation in the United States, stresses that Miami’s history is 
changing quickly and the truthfulness of the joke that ‘Miami is the only city in the United States 
with its own foreign policy’. Observations made by Park and Gottlieb are also pointers to the 
impact the CAC has on American society, Washington and Havana. The diverging short paragraphs 
of Miami’s history, portray the difference of context wherein subsequent migration waves came 
to Miami, in its turn creating a perceptual change towards the Cuban Revolution. When I spoke 
with Grenier,21 he explained this complexity by means of the 1959 revolutionary earthquake that 
caused seismic waves in the lifetime of all ethnic Cubans. The distance – tierra y tiempo – between 
the starting point and generations of subsequent Cuban migrations marks the degree of influence. 
Gottlieb also addressed the significant impact of pre-migration experience to the transnational 
complexity of the CAC in Miami: 
 
My wife’s grandfather with whom I lived had his farm taken, his whole life taken and he 
was educated under the old system. He couldn’t even see the colour red. He hated 
everything about the Communist government. Then, there is my in-laws. My father-in-law 
was educated for free, he became a physicist in Cuba. He wouldn’t join the party, so he was 
taken from the college setting and made to taught reform school or escuelas de conducta. 
They are for children who don’t behave well, in the countryside, because he wouldn’t join 
the party. He was arrested for listening to radio Free America. And so his views 
[grandfather] and my in-laws views are ambivalent, insofar as they [his in-laws] were 
educated, good college, without a charge and didn’t have any of their own possessions 
taken. And they were not sympathetic to that government, and still are not. But they don’t 
have that vitriolic hatred that their parents had. And then there is my wife’s generation, 
my wife came here as a young girl [1.5 generation]. She said: ‘my education was better in 
Cuba’. At five years old, she was learning the letters and started learning basic scientific 
principles for elementary. While here, in the US, all that kids did was play games and take 
naps all day. (2016) 
 
I reason that the lived experience of pre-migration in Cuba, and subsequent flight from their 
homeland while losing everything they owned, has created a personal and ideological hatred 
towards Fidel Castro and the Communist regime, which has become their identity. Young Cubans 
of the 1.5 generation, were still influenced by the their (grand)parents and highly politicized 
community in Miami, but didn’t have that same memory or lived experience and therefore weren’t 
                                                          
18 See Castro, 2013:27-30. 
19 Interview with Dr. Guillermo Grenier, 2 June 2016 at FIU, Miami. 
20 Interview with Dr. Andrew Gottlieb, 14 June 2016 at Restaurant Versailles, Little Havana, Miami. 
21 Interview with Dr. Guillermo Grenier, 2 June 2016 at FIU, Miami. 
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as hard line as the first generation. This generation had less awareness and understanding of the 
Cuban Revolution in its moment and the nature of exile. Both Juan Jimenez22 and Gladys Goméz-
Rossié23 are children of the Pedro Pan operation. Their statement endorses this observation that 
they were not conscious of migration and its rationale. Nonetheless, they both argue that their 
parents made the right choice. This is coherent with the testimony of Elsie Miranda24, born in 1963 
in Miami and an associate professor of practical Theology at Barry University. Like Jimenez and 
Goméz-Rossié she praises her grandparents courage, but also reflects on her own transnational 
identity: 
 
They choose to be free in exile, rather than at home and oppressed. Like my parents, [they] 
are marked by their loses, and stanch anti-Castro people. (…) It [the Cuban Revolution] 
took away their identity, with the expropriation of property, and the need to get out or die. 
That influenced me too. I inherited [these] memories of pain, that weren’t mine, but I 
associated with them. I entered into their reality, without judgement. But I didn’t lose 
anything, I only had something to gain. I wanted to make my own memories, establish my 
own relationship with who had been losers in history as well. They helped me understand 
my poverty, as I did with theirs. (2016) 
 
Juan Jimenez started understanding the history of the Cuban Revolution and its diaspora in Miami 
at the age of 17 and became fanatically anti-Castro but has mellowed over the years. Nowadays, 
he supports normalization of binational relations. 
 As I have elaborated briefly in the last chapter, a period of economic incentives and 
relaxation policies under President Clinton and the Cuban government, was followed by the fierce 
anti-Castro policies of the Bush administration in 2004. Bush tightened and restricted effective 
homeland ties: remittances, network communication, travels. But as McGillion and Morley already 
indicated, by the 1990s: 
 
the family ties between Cubans in the United States and Cubans on the island had become 
too well established and too important to be easily severed. (2005: 15) 
 
I assume that this was probably just as true around 2000, with the continued influx of 
transmigrants since 1995, and despite Bush’s return to anti-Castro politics, as the remittance 
figures showed an insignificant decrease to US$800 million in 2005. The more recent the 
immigrant, the more likely the desire to have a good relationship with Cuba. Grenier believes that 
the desire for ‘normative’ transnational ties helped President Obama to win Florida in 2008, 
because of the discontent among Cuban Americans about the Bush era. Many Presidents preceded 
Obama and could have the same thing, but Grenier25 argued: ‘Cuba just isn’t important enough, 
and why mess with it? Why chance Cubans getting mad in Miami?’ But Obama preached change 
and redeemed his promises by creating transnational space through policies, stimulated the 
transnational activity of Cuban Americans, and searched for opportunities to engage in the small 
private sector of the Cuban economy, which was created by the Cuban government (Krull and 
Perez, 2014: 292-293). 
 
3.2 Breaking Blocked Transnationalism since the 1990s 
 
In the previous section we have seen how the Cuban-American demographics have changed along 
with the transnational identity, and how slowly a transnational social space with reciprocal 
intentions for further engagement has rooted on the Florida Strait. The following section will 
                                                          
22 Telephone interview with Juan Jimenez, 1 June 2016, HI Hosteling International, Miami Beach. 
23 Interview with Gladys Goméz-Rossié, 17 June 2016, Cuban Heritage Collection, University of Miami. 
24 Interview with Dr. Elsie Miranda, June 15th,2016, University of Miami, Miami. 
25 Interview with Dr. Guillermo Grenier, 2 June 2016 at FIU, Miami. 
 
30 
elaborate on the demolition of transnational blockages on each of the three transnational 
dimensions; the historical perspective allows for analysis of the contemporary status quo, backed 
by the elaboration of Cuban-American narratives on specific topics obtained during my fieldwork. 
 
3.2.1 Political dimension 
 
The Cuban Revolution created an impossible triangle. The Cuban exiles symbolized the anti-
Communist sentiment of the Cold War by fleeing communism and making an alliance with the 
United States, while losing their citizen rights and being used as ideological ammunition for the 
Cuban Revolution. This geopolitical context made normative transnational linkages impossible, 
except for oppositional political and military activism, until the 1980s. 
 
On most matters they [the Golden Exiles] pressed for minimal cross-border engagement, 
engagement which they perceived would both help keep Castro in power and taint their 
moral high ground. (Eckstein, 2004: 32) 
 
Political organization of the exile community has been characterized by two groups, los 
intransigentes (mostly Republicans) who fiercely oppose any engagement with the Castro regime 
and feel betrayed by the normalization of binational relations, while los moderados (mostly 
Democrats) support normalization and a ‘new’ direction in US foreign policies towards Cuba 
(Pedraza, 2016: 277). 
The stigmatization of the CAC with the Mariel Boatlift, made the first cohort decide to 
demarcate their refugee status in relation to the new arrivals; they closed political resources for 
this cohort and created a policy of self-defence. During my interview with Alejandro Portes26 – a 
prominent sociologist at Princeton University and Cuban exile himself, whose work I have used 
extensively throughout my analysis – argued that the clear dichotomy, lack of acceptance, 
assimilation and political participation within the CAC has contributed to the transnational 
identity of the more recent arrivals: 
 
The new arrivals from Cuba are much less politicized. Perhaps the experience of their 
growing up in the revolution, makes [clear] that they have no political voice here [in 
Miami]. The political voice of the CAC, such as it is, continues to be the old-timers or their 
children’s. The political presence of the recent arrivals coming from Cuba is close to zero. 
They are actually transforming things by their actions, going back and forth and creating 
this transnational realm, not by any kind of political voice or organizations within the 
American political system. They were thoroughly inoculated against politics because of 
their life in Cuba, in the highly political sense. They didn’t want to alienate or confront the 
old Cubans who politically controlled the city [of Miami]... Many people would say: ‘They 
are not like us. We don’t have any particular tie with them.’ And that’s the generalized view 
of the old Cuban establishment. (2016) 
 
After 1980, subsequent waves weren’t considered eligible for the same type of privileges that the 
political refugees had earned. In addition to their own motivations for leaving Cuba, it is possible 
that this oppositional stance from the receiving actors towards the Marielitos and post-Mariel 
Cuban Americans has contributed to a stronger transnational identity with a particular focus on 
the economic and sociocultural dimension. 
 The educational level of Cubans in Miami-Dade consists of 56.1 per cent who achieved high 
school graduation or less, 21.3 per cent having a college or associate degree, and 22.7 per cent 
having achieved at least a bachelor’s degree. As Portes argues, higher educational and 
occupational status has a positive effect on migrants having transnational linkages. The first 
cohort of the ‘Golden Exiles’, highly educated and economically successful, have contradicted this 
assumption. I reason this is because of the historical and political context of the Cuban Revolution 
                                                          
26 Personal interview with Dr. Alejandro Portes, 20 June 2016, University of Miami, Florida. 
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through which political exiles only had transnational ties through their activism in opposition to 
Fidel Castro; other desires or possibilities for transnationalism were non-existent. This evolution 
contrasts to Portes arguing that a high level of ‘human capital’ or education results in more 
political activity towards the homeland (2007: 84; Portes, 2014: 209). During my interview with 
him Portes27 emphasized that the recent arrivals came from a Cuban political system that left their 
political awareness underdeveloped. In the literature I encountered a brief historical analysis of 
political generations within the CAC in Miami: 
 
The 1990s émigrés differ from the early émigrés also in their island political formation, 
and associated views. They lived the revolution, many with little or no first-hand 
knowledge or memories of the pre-revolutionary period. They consequently experienced 
no civil society involvement independent of the state, as had the middle and upper classes 
before the revolution. But by virtue of living most if not all their lives under Castro they 
had a nuanced understanding of conditions in Cuba, and they were socialized by the 
revolution. Thus, for this cohort, unlike the first, Castro’s Cuba was not imagined and the 
pre-revolutionary society not idealized. (Eckstein, 2004: 14) 
 
Along with the lack of political awareness and economic resources of post-Mariel migrants, their 
different rationales to migrate and lower education made them politically insignificant. In 2015, 
ABCs in Miami-Dade County comprised 29.1 per cent of the total population. Of the 681,873 
foreign-born Cubans, only six out of ten were naturalized US citizens, a requirement for political 
voting rights.28 Thus, recent arrivals have created transnational bridges by their actions instead 
of through the policies and laws of the administrations produced in Washington and Havana (US 
Census bureau, 2015). This evolution of the political dimension was underlined by Sean 
Foreman,29 a Professor in Political Science at Barry University, and Pedro Roig,30 a Senior Research 
Associate at the Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies (ICCAS) in Miami. 
 President Obama had won almost half of the Cuban votes in Florida during the 2012 
elections.31 His normalization policy of 17 December 2014 (D-17) of building transnational 
bridges with the Cuba of President Raúl Castro, was polled among Cuban Americans in Florida. 
The divisions in transnational identity and political activism among the generations of Cuban-
Americans became clear through the results of a survey by Bendixen and Amandi International32 
in the aftermath: only 38 per cent of the foreign born agreed with Obama’s announcement of 
normalization, against 64 per cent of the ABCs. Of the Cuban born, 64 per cent of the pre-1980 
arrivals disagreed, while only 44 per cent of the post-1980 arrivals disagreed. In the 18-49 age 
cohort, 77 per cent supported the Obama policy, while a small majority (51%) of those 65+ 
disagreed (Caputo and Flechas, 2014). Two years later, the 2016 FIU Cuban Poll among 1000 
randomly selected Cuban-Americans in Miami-Dade County found that the majority (64%) were 
in favour of normalizing relations with Cuba. Among ABCs and the Cuban born, the figures were 
almost even (60% and 65%). The survey showed a clear gap between Cuban-Americans who were 
not registered to vote (88% in favour) and those who could vote (55% in favour). These 
percentages are similar to the ‘date of arrival’ – 1995-2016 arrivals portray 89% in favour, while 
pre-1980 migrants are 38% in favour. Regional differences among Cuban-Americans in the US are 
also observed; among those closer to Cuba, in Florida, five out of ten Cubans approved the 
normalization, against 63 per cent in the rest of the US. These results comply with Grenier’s33 
argument during our interview. The old enclave has kept Cuban Americans in Miami incubated 
                                                          
27 Ibid. 
28 More information on voting eligibility in the United States: http://resources.lawinfo.com/civil-rights/right-to-
vote/what-are-the-requirements-to-be-eligible-to-v.html. 
29 Interview with Dr. Sean Foreman, 7 June 2016, Barry University, Miami. 
30 Interview with Pedro Roig, 31 May 2016, Instutition for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies, Miami. 
31 see Hugo Lopez and Taylor, 2012. 
32 Research group consists of 400 Cuban Americans, more than half living in Florida. 56 per cent living in Florida 
disagreed with Obama’s announcement (Amandi, 2015) 
33 Interview with Dr. Guillermo Grenier, 2 June 2016 at FIU, Miami. 
 32 
with the exile ideology: ‘they were still close to ground zero of the exile experience’, while Cuban-
Americans in the rest of the US developed different views on Cuba and American society (Amandi, 
2015; Grenier and Baldwin, 2016). 
Vicente Blanco-Capoté34 is on the board of the Bay of Pigs museum. He was among the first 
that fled in exile and fought with the 2506 Brigade in April 1961; he opposes any transnational 
engagement with Cuba while the regime is still in place. 
 
We hated the policy of the Democrat government [Obama], we don’t agree with that. The 
Kennedy betrayed us. Obama betrayed us too. In Cuba there is no change, it is still the same 
people. There is no change. It is a Kingdom. That is a country in control of the [population 
of] Cuba, with the backup of China and Russia. There is no change. (2016) 
 
Juan Jimenez,35 Law Librarian at the University of Miami, a Pedro Pan child (10 years), had no 
understanding of the Cuban Revolution and migration when it occurred and explained that: 
 
when I was 16/17 I got more knowledge and interest into what had happened and why I 
had to leave the island … I became a really anti-Castro fanatic. But I have to say that 
through the years I have mellowed. I would favour normalizing relations because the 
embargo failed. It is better to change the policy of failure into something that you don’t 
know if it is going to work, than maintaining something of what you’re sure of that is 
failing. (telephone interview, 1 June 2016) 
 
I interviewed a Cuban American who came in 2004 at the age of 16. She said that she was 
‘brainwashed with revolutionary thoughts’. She came with family through el Bombo,36 mainly for 
economic reasons. She still has family and friends on the island and has helped them a dozen times 
because of her own lived experience of scarcity in Cuba. She analysed the D-17 announcement: 
 
Many people say: ‘oh, it is going to give more money to the government’. But as long as it 
brings more money to Cuba, and more people travel to Cuba, it creates jobs. There is more 
exchange between the American and Cuban people, they learn. I mean, there is an 
exchange of information, money, goods and services. And I do think it is helpful. Even if it 
is helpful to the government, it is also helpful to the people. And that is what I care about. 
(Anonymous, 2016) 
 
As a second-generation Cuban-American, Cherie Canio works with her family’s business which 
focusses on Cuba. She supports Obama’s normalization policies and lifting the embargo because 
it would make life better for the people in Cuba, and will engage Cubans on and off the island 
(telephone interview with Cherie Canio, 21 June 2016). 
From the literature, statistics and personal narratives that I have analysed, I would 
describe the evolution of the CAC political position by the changing demographics; individual 
opinions haven’t changed, but collective opinion has. The old establishment personified through 
Señor Blanco-Capoté portray a pre-migration experience that generated a hatred towards Castro 
that became his life. He fought against Castro at Playa de Girón, for which Casal and Hernandez 
have argued that they are the ‘real political refugees’37 (1975: 27), and have not changed their 
                                                          
34 Interview with Vicente Blanco-Capote, 10 June 2016, Bay of Pigs Museum, Little Havana, Miami. 
35 Telephone interview with Juan Jimenez, 1 June 2016, HI Hosteling International, Miami Beach. 
36 The lottery system that was created under President Clinton in 1996 and granted 20,000 Cubans per year a visa to 
move the United States (Aschkenas, 2006: 93). 
37 Michel Vain, who came to the US in 2009, made a similar argument: ‘It [Cuban migration after 1959] has never been 
a political question within the community in the first place. The first generations only fled Cuba to have a better future 
in Miami, they didn’t care about the political situation of the Castro’s. For me a political refugee is someone who takes 
action against the new regime and flees to avoid prosecution. In that way you can say that the Bay of Pigs exiles are the 
only political refugees’ (interview with Michel Vain, 25 May, 2016, HI Hosteling Internationa, Miami Beach). 
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mind. Pedro Roig38 from the ICCAS emphasized this by stating that: ‘the older ones [Golden Exiles] 
are dying, not changing their minds… not one Cuban has changed. Those who were in favour, are 
in favour; those who are against, are against’ (2016), although generalizing was avoided in my 
interview with fellow Bay of Pigs veteran, William Muir. His statement can imply that engagement 
based on reciprocity is tolerable: 
 
This reconciliation policy of Barack Obama is a total failure until now. The deal was based 
on the US giving and Cuba didn’t give anything in return (interview by telephone with 
William Muir, 3 June 2016, Miami). 
 
The recent arrivals and ABCs bare little resentment towards the Cuban regime, and qualify the 
status quo rationally. They don’t feel the burden of a ‘destructive’ lived experience and are more 
pragmatic towards having bilateral ties. They reason that political engagement is best for 
everyone. 
 
3.2.2 Economic dimension 
 
Until recently, the Cuban state-controlled economy has not allowed private business and property, 
but since the inauguration Raúl Castro, has permitted private business39 although still highly 
regulated. These measures have stimulated Cubans–Americans to send remittances and 
strengthen transnational ties to enhance entrepreneurship and ameliorate their economic 
situation. Nonetheless, the caution of the Cuban-Americans that had lived through the Cuban 
Revolution became visible during the interview with William Muir,40 a Bay of Pigs veteran who 
has spent almost two years in a Cuban prison as a prisoner of war, but nonetheless showed a more 
moderate political stance towards the Castro regime.41 When asked about his economic support 
to Cuba he addressed the delicate and uncertain process of investing in Cuba; ‘the government 
will take anything into their possession, whenever they want’ (2016). It is one of the main reasons 
why economic transnational ties have been channelled through remittances and sending goods to 
family and friends. Ten per cent of the islands’ labour force is self-employed, one-third of the 
private businesses that have surged are funded by Cuban-American remittances. It supplied 
Cubans on the island with the means to stimulate the economy and set-up small businesses, e.g. 
guesthouses and family restaurants42 (Paladares). As I have argued, this increased dramatically 
with the influx of the Marielitos, who displayed a strong transnational identity towards their life 
on Cuba, friends and family. Informal transmitting services created alternative options for the CAC 
to distance themselves from the impediments and built transnational trust, an important variable 
that had been absent during the subsequent decades after the revolution. Afro-Cubans are known 
profited little from these transnational activities because of their lack of relatives abroad. They 
were the populace upon which the socialist Cuban Revolution was built and therefore few of them 
had emigrated (Krull and Perez, 2014: 290-294; Eckstein and Barberia, 2008: 270; Duany, 2016: 
24). 
  Numbers of dollars remitted in the 1980s are unavailable owing to the illegality of 
circulation until 1993 and the fact that the Cuban government never published official data. 
Eckstein calculates around US$50 million in the early nineties. Even with the policies to block 
transnationalism imposed by the US government, remittances and travel – through third countries 
– injected millions of dollars into the Cuban economy, an estimated US$537 million in 1995. This 
                                                          
38 Interview with Pedro Roig, 31 May 2016, Instutition for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies, Miami. 
39 By the fall of 2013 there was an increase from 178 to 201 occupations in which it was legal to be self-employed (Ritter 
and Henken, 2014: 292). 
40 Telephone interview with William Muir, 3 June 2016, HI Hostelling International, Miami Beach. 
41 This tendency of suspicion by the ‘Golden Exiles’ towards the homeland regime is congruent with an analysis of the 
first-generation immigrants of the Vietnamese-American community, a community that was also formed by threats of 
communism (Portes and Fernández-Kelly, 2015: 167-168). 
42 see Duany, 2011: 147. 
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increase was caused by economic deterrence in Cuba and the Balsero crisis. During my interview 
with him, Guillermo Grenier43 argued that: 
 
[Cuban migrants] after the Periodo Especial is 40% of the Cuban-American community. It 
is a big bulk. These are the transnational Cubans; they behave different, have different 
view about the revolution and Cuba, and behave different about it. (2016) 
 
In the twenty-first century, remittances became the third-largest source foreign exchange. In 
2005, President Bush imposed restrictions and remittances decreased to $800 million. To work 
around the cap, Cuban Americans send money by informal remitting services and mules. In 2011 
estimates varied between US$500 million and US$1.2 billion per year, and they accumulated to 
US$3.13 billion in 2014 (Eckstein, 2009: 179; Duany, 2011: 147-148; Duany, 2016: 25; Portes and 
Fernández-Kelly, 2015: 125). In 2007 a survey showed that almost 2.5 times more Cuban 
Americans who came after 1989 – although far poorer – send remittances to kin on the island than 
the immigrants from 1959-1964 (Krull and Perez, 2014: 293). I have analysed that this distortion 
in remittances sending per cohort can be explained through differences in the pre-migration 
experiences, awareness of scarcity and poverty on the island, and lack of a ‘family project’, i.e. 
interconnection with family on the island to care for. 
The 2016 FIU Cuba Poll shows that 47 per cent of the Cuban Americans support friends or 
relatives on the island by sending money, while 42 per cent report sending other items (Grenier 
and Baldwin, 2016). Furthermore, 70 per cent of Cuba’s cell phone market, which adds up to more 
than 3 million phones in 2015, is financed by Cuban Americans abroad. 
 
Cuban Americans make more than 50 million telephone calls per year to Cuba, and Cubans 
living abroad send millions of dollars in packages, including food, clothes, medicine and 
other assets. Nearly half a million Cuban-Americans travelled to Cuba in 2013. They took 
with them merchandise worth millions of dollars, such as electrical appliances, spare 
parts, and other items used to develop and maintain businesses on the island. (Duany, 
2016: 24) 
 
All these developments are the results of policy changes by the Cuban and US government, e.g. 
improvement of telecommunications networks, to allow Cuban and Cuban-American travel, 
abolition of restrictions on travel imports – that were identified in Chapter 2. The 2016 FIU Cuba 
Poll shows that the opinion of the CAC on the economic embargo has changed throughout the 
years too. In 1997, eight out of ten Cuban-Americans supported the embargo. In 2008, after the 
restrictive years of the Bush administration and the election of Barack Obama, this percentage had 
declined to 55 per cent. Grenier44 clarifies these figures by postulating that: 
 
One of the reasons Obama ended up getting more votes [of Cuban Americans]... U.S-Cuban 
relations [under Bush] was impeding the transnational tendencies of this last group [the 
post-Balseros]. (2016) 
 
But during recent elections, the majority (54%) of Cuban Americans sided again with the 
Republicans. It appears that the Cuban-American vote went to Donald Trump because of his fierce 
rhetoric for a more reciprocal ‘normalization’ of bilateral relations. Although Obama has gained a 
lot of support with his reconciliation policy, many argue it is unilateral in nature, and Cuba falls 
short (Krogstad and Flores, 2016; Vazquez, 2017). 
I have indicated that a main focus of Cuban-American exile politics was on maintaining 
and tightening the embargo. It still is a threshold policy blocking full normalization of Cuba-US 
relations, but the shift in position of the CAC in Miami towards the embargo is significant. Cuban-
Americans living in Miami who favoured ending the embargo had increased from 43 per cent in 
                                                          
43 Interview with Dr. Guillermo Grenier, 2 June 2016 at FIU, Miami. 
44 Interview with Dr. Guillermo Grenier, 2 June 2016 at FIU, Miami. 
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2007 to 63 per cent in 2016 (Grenier and Baldwin, 2016). I discussed the issue during my 
fieldwork with Cuban Americans of different cohorts. At the Cuban Heritage Collections of the 
University of Miami, I asked Gómez-Rossié45 – a Pedro Pan child – how she saw the reconciliation 
policy of Barack Obama. Being 14 she had no understanding of the Cuban Revolution and her 
migration, i.e. she lived through it but didn’t understand it. Now she said that: 
 
My generation marks the embargo. I think at this point the embargo is an excuse that the 
Cuban government uses in front of the rest of the world. (…) But the rest of the world 
hasn’t got an embargo on you. But that country who has, is sending you medicine, and that 
country is your economy, your exile. The number one money that goes into the Cuban 
economy is exile. The people outside are maintaining the people inside. I would say ‘NO’ 
to maintaining the embargo. (…) Do they want to take the embargo out, the Cuban 
government? I don’t think so, because that is their excuse’ (2016). 
 
Her observation was confirmed by Elsie Miranda46, said that: ‘the embargo was Castro’s trump 
card for every wrong on the island. But we shouldn’t be naïve and give them everything’. (2016) 
On the other hand William Muir,47 a prisoner of war after the failed Bay of Pigs invasion, argues 
that: 
 
People who say that the embargo is a total failure are wrong, because at the first place the 
embargo wasn’t designed as a punishment for the Castro regime. It was already there 
when Castro started his revolution. But Fidel never used the embargo as an excuse until 
the 1990s because the economy was abundantly sponsored by the USSR. But in the end 
Cuba can get almost any product or service from any the US if they pay cash up front. 
(2016) 
 
Yvonne Odette,48 an ABC, is an Associate Administrator Business Development at a hospital in 
Miami, who argued that the embargo: ‘only alienated the people who love Cuba from it’ and ‘a 
move [Obama’s] is better than no move. But it’s not a fair trade’ (2016). Yllien Verdés,49 an ABC, 
grew up outside the Cuban-American enclave in Miami, and has co-owned a family dental office in 
Little Havana for 20 years: 
 
It doesn’t really matter how, but the embargo has showed that isn’t the way. I support any 
intention that will try and reach for that [economic opportunities and political freedom]. 
(2016) 
 
Jorge Perez50 a 21-year-old, studies Legal Psychology, has family living in Cuba and has visited 
them a couple of times: 
 
to me trading would be good, because they have things to offer to us and we have things 
to offer to them, and trade is always going to be beneficial. (2016) 
 
The figures of recent research have proved that the embargo is denounced by most of Cuban-
Americans living in Miami, especially recent arrivals and US-born Cubans. Although the 
observations on the embargo vary between generations, it seems that most Cuban Americans 
question its functionality within the current status quo. Muir’s postulation that the embargo isn’t 
a failure because it was constituted for Batista, and the Cuban regime only uses the embargo to 
                                                          
45 Interview with Gladys Goméz-Rossié, 17 June 2016, Cuban Heritage Collection, University of Miami. 
46 Interview with Dr. Elsie Miranda, June 15th,2016, University of Miami, Miami. 
47 Telephone interview with William Muir, 3 June 2016, HI Hostelling International, Miami Beach. 
48 Telephone interview with Yvonne Odette, 10 June HI Hostelling International, Miami Beach. 
49 Interview with Yllien Verdés, 19 June 2016, Coral Gables, Miami. 
50 Interview with Jorge Perez, 8 June 2016, Miami Beach 
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cover up their own mess, sees removing it as a good policy change, either way. Unlike the first 
cohort, who see the embargo as retaliation for the Cuban Revolution and the destruction of Cuba, 
post-1980 migrants – even some earlier Cubans – and the second generation observe the codified 
law as blocking the development of Cuba, the country and people they care for. It is an outdated 
Cold War mechanism which downplays the current transnational desire and possibility of 
normalizing binational relations. 
 
3.2.3 Sociocultural dimensions 
 
Ethnic identity and culture as an affective transnational linkage was described in the first chapter 
by Portes and Fernández-Kelly, and Cubanidad shows itself to be ever present among Cuban 
Americans in Miami.51 It is the emotional connection that is inherited in the cultural identity of the 
diaspora (2015: 176). Cubanidad was described by Cherie Canio,52 an ABC, through her own 
perception: 
 
When I was in Louisiana I started noticing that I was missing cafecito’s, croquetas, the smell 
of my dad’s Cuban cigars and speaking Spanish. For me these are the Cuban things. (2016) 
 
The political contact had redefined what it meant to be Cuban in exile and demarcated a cultural 
space to survive as a unique entity in the United States. As Cuban migration was perceived as 
temporary, Cubans didn’t assimilate completely. They preserved Cuban identity and 
commemorated their legacy: 
 
Cubanidad eased their adaptation to the United States. By giving hardship a larger 
meaning, it psychologically empowered them to deal with exile. (García, 1996: 83-84) 
 
The preservation of the Cuban identity is fundamental to Cuban settlement in Miami. As Grenier 
argued in 2003, Cubans reject any relation to a hyphenated identity or pan-ethnic identity. During 
my interviews, most interviewees identified themselves as Cuban. Pedro Roig53 confirmed this 
posture by saying: 
 
We don’t like the word Latino, because it has gained a negative connotation in the US. We 
are Cubans, or Hispanics because of our heritage from the Spanish. (2016)  
 
Unlike the old enclave, the post-Mariel immigrants did not see themselves as refugees but as 
migrants. And with the rise of the ABCs, I would argue that the ‘exile’ ideology of the Cuban 
Revolution and the Cold War lost influence on the identity of the CAC in Miami. Instead of living 
through history, Cubans of the 1.5 generation want to connect with their roots, as they only have 
childhood memories and an imagined conception of Cuba. ABCs do not have a pre-migration 
memory, and thus, as Grenier and Pérez argue ‘have not lost a home, they have gained a heritage’ 
(2003: 200; Eckstein and Barberia, 2002: 816). The ABCs and post-Mariel engage in physical 
cross-border bonding through sociocultural organizations, it appears. Some of the second-
generation Cubans with whom I spoke have engaged with contemporaries in Cuba through 
‘people-to-people’ linkages and travelling, e.g. they have founded CubaOne, a sociocultural 
organization that creates these transnational linkages (Canio and Jimenez,54 2016). 
The FIU Cuba Poll of 2016 supports this finding of a sociocultural desire to engage with 
Cuba through travels and people-to-people contact; three-quarters of the participants supported 
unrestricted travel by all Americans and opportunities for ‘people-to-people’ contact with Cuba; 
                                                          
51 An investigation done by PewReseach among 350 Cuban-American adults shows that 63 per cent perceived 
themselves as Cuban, while only two out of ten saw themselves as American (López, 2015). 
52 Telephone interview with Cheri Canio, 21 June 2016, HI Hostelling International, Miami Beach. 
53 Interview with Pedro Roig, 31 May 2016, Instutition for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies, Miami. 
54 Ibid.; interview with Daniel Jimenez, 27 May 2016, Miami Beach. 
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in 1997 these figures were the other way around. Forty-five per cent of the Cuban born had 
travelled to Cuba after leaving the island, but only a quarter of the pre-1980 migrants did. These 
results are consistent with literature analysed in the previous chapters on generational 
characteristics: the second generation and the recent arrivals were predominantly in favour of 
sociocultural transnationalism (Grenier and Baldwin, 2016). Travel to Cuba eradicates des from 
destierro and destiempo, the concepts of physical removal and personal dislocation of the 
homeland formed through exile. Experiences of transnational sociocultural ties revive the 
memory or legacy of a family identity. This family identity is considered to be very strong and 
going back to Cuba is a ‘state of mind’, as children of first wavers – even those who were under a 
year old at the time of migration – call travelling to Cuba ‘going back’. 
Some Cuban Americans have travelled to Cuba despite the moral objection of their parents 
(Eckstein and Barberia, 2002: 816-825). Elsie Miranda55 told me that: 
 
I was able to drop the legacy and heritage of my parents and grandparents, and I went 
there as a blank page to write my own narrative. (2016) 
 
Elsie Miranda has created CubaEvolution, a foundation to establish mutually beneficial relations 
between the US and Cuba, with churches and larger society. Some have respected the travel 
boycott of their parents. Yllien Verdés,56 told me that she can’t go to Cuba because she didn’t want 
to cause her parents that anxiety or worry, otherwise she would have gone (2016). Like Daniel 
Jimenez57, other Cuban-Americans needed both governments to change the binational 
relationship in order to create space for them to engage with Cuba (2016).  
  
                                                          
55 Interview with Dr. Elsie Miranda, June 15th,2016, University of Miami, Miami. 
56 Interview with Yllien Verdés, June 19th, 2016, Coral Gables, Miami. 
57 interview with Daniel Jimenez, 27 May 2016, Miami Beach. 
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Conclusion 
 
Transnationalism changed the academic debate on migration studies in the late 1980s. Many 
prominent scholars have contributed to the theoretical debate on transnationalism discussed in 
Chapter 1, much of whose work in Cuban and Cuban-American Studies has addressed significant 
variables in the creation of a transnational social space, in particular of an exile community. The 
notion of an exile community makes transnationalism salient because of the ‘Impossible Triangle’, 
the diaspora aligning with the government of the host country, in opposition to the government 
of their nation of origin, which creates a transnational realm, based on political and militant 
activism in opposition to the Cuban Revolution. According to Vertovec, that transnationalism and 
identity are intertwined because of the significance of a cultural identity of common place of 
origin; I argue this is the foundation of a transnational identity shaping cross-border behaviour 
and motivations across political, economic and sociocultural dimensions. In addition, many 
scholars have addressed the (geo)political and economic context wherein migration and 
resettlement occur as significant to one’s desire to materialize transnational identity and built 
transnational linkages; the role of policies and laws designed by the respective nation-states 
create an situation of “blocked transnationalism” to providing transnational bridges. 
The concept of ‘blocked transnationalism’ has been elaborated throughout this research, 
as this phenomenon has been the reality for the Cuban-American exile community in Miami. At 
the University of Miami, Portes addressed the non-existence of blocked transnationalism for 
Cuban-Americans ignited by the transnational activism of recent arrivals, which forced the 
Washington administration to change US-Cuba policy. I would argue that a fully normalized 
transnational social space is not in place, because the cradle of US-Cuba policy and Cuban-
American exile politics after the Cuban Revolution is still in place – the economic embargo. 
Nonetheless, the contemporary consensus in Miami is that a majority of the Cuban Americans 
favour ending the embargo, nuanced by different generations and cohorts during my interviews. 
These figures and statements perpetuate the changing transnational identity of the CAC in Miami. 
My research question addresses the change of transnational identity and the breakdown of the 
‘Cold Wall’ on the Florida Strait, namely: What are the main rationales that have transformed the 
transnational identity of the CAC in Miami towards Cuba? and how have the (geo)political and 
economic context, and US and Cuban government policies influenced the (non-)existence of a blocked 
transnational social space between Miami and Cuba? The hypothesis that my research had to prove 
to be true was whether: the demographic evolution has changed the transnational identity of the 
CAC in Miami and torn down the ‘Cold Wall’ created by Cuban and US government policies to prevent 
the CAC in Miami from materializing their desire of having transnational ties with Cuba. I argue the 
hypothesis is supported because the regulation of Cuban migration and transnationalism has 
blocked ‘normative’ transnational ties, but contributed to the changing demography of the CAC 
which resulted in the crumbling of the Cold Wall., I will further elaborate on this beginning with 
the context. 
 Cuban migrations during the last two centuries have all occurred because of the political 
context on the island, but the Cuban Revolution has constituted a significant exodus of Cubans 
towards the United States, to Miami in particular. Cuba’s exceptional position in global and 
hemispheric relations stems from the Spanish Empire, and one of the few successful socialist 
revolutions; this added another chapter to Cuban exceptionalism, and determined the indefinite 
future of Cuba-US relations, of David vs. Goliath, with or without the consent of those involved. Its 
prelude began in 1823 when US Secretary of State, John Adams, called Cuba a ‘natural appendage’ 
of the US and, after the Spanish American war, Cuba’s political and economic system was designed 
to be subordinate to US interests. Its ideological father, José Martí, led Fidel Castro to mobilize 
domestic discontent of the working class and created momentum in the context of the Cold War. 
His 26th of July movement sparked Cubans’ nationalist pride and the dignity of those Cubans who 
had lost it through their subjugation, and ignited the Cuban Revolution. 
The CAC in Miami can be divided by generations, cohorts and migration waves. The first 
cohort described as the ‘political refugees’ is, to a large extent, made up of two migration waves: 
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the ‘early exiles’ (1959-1962), an acute refugee movement stemming from a crisis, whose 
migration was seen as temporary due to the probability of US activity concerning communism 90 
miles offshore – the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion is seen as the moment that perception was 
abolished – and the ‘airlift’ (1965-1973), an anticipatory refugee movement. The majority were 
Cuban elites, Batistianos, mainly white and highly educated, who fled the island when Castro 
began expropriating property and nationalizing businesses and schools. This cohort was 
denominated the ‘Golden Exiles’ and the ‘new builders of Miami’. Most Cubans came with the 
whole family or were reunited eventually, and lost everything including their citizenship; 
incrementation they were stigmatized by Castro as ‘traitors’ and the psychological burden of 
being exiled suppressed any desire for transnational ties. Torres has argued that this political 
memory of exile, a personal dislocation through exile destierro – geographical removal and 
destiempo – involved loss of personal and social structures. They maintained their ‘affective ties’ 
by preserving the Cuban identity and culture in Miami’s Little Havana. Another part of their 
transnational identity was materialized by means of exile politics and military activism fed by the 
exile ideology: an anti-Castro posture and establish a free and democratic Cuba. Their alliance to 
the US and its symbolic value within the political context of the Cold War provided a privileged 
position in American society with federal support for resettlement, unknown to other immigrant 
groups. Their common pre-migration social class, post-migration experiences, strong adherence 
to Cuban culture and fierce opposition to Castro created a fairly cohesive community, maintained 
even by means of repression until the late 1990s. Their entrepreneurial competences helped the 
Cuban-American community to adapt to a new life in the United States. Making the exile ideology 
and Cubanidad fundamental to the community in the US eased their adaptation to American 
society. This cohort gained great economic prosperity and political influence in Washington, 
enabled them to preserve the economic embargo which is still in place today. 
 From the 1980s onwards Cuban migration involved rationales for migration and a 
transnational identity that was different from the first cohort. The Mariel Boatlift was an critical 
refugee movement that brought in 125,000 Cubans who lived under Castro’s government for over 
20 years and wanted to leave because of repression and economic failure. They sought 
socioeconomic improvement in the United States, but also retained part of their life in Cuba. They 
had no political memory of being exiled or longing for a pre-revolutionary social order. People of 
these migration waves were people disillusioned by the Cuban Revolution, and what was 
supposedly their victory. This group was a representative sample of the Cuban population, but 
American society wasn’t as tolerant and the old enclave prevented their use of the extensive exile 
network to assimilate properly. This group included the migrants who came for economic reasons 
and displayed a desire for transnational ties. As Grenier argued during our interview, growing up 
in American society outside the Cuban enclave in Miami changed views on Cuba; I argue that being 
blocked from it also bind you more closely to the homeland. But the Communist threat still 
legitimized hard-line anti-Castro policies by political exile organizations and influenced US foreign 
policy towards Cuba; more progressive and transnational postures towards Cuba were repressed 
within Cuba, by all means. Yet even in this climate, there were visible changes;: President Carter 
relaxed transnational policies on remitting and travel. Fidel Castro considered Cuban Americans 
as a source of income and referred to the diaspora as ‘the Cuban community abroad’, talked with 
a moderate Cuban-American exile organization in Miami and released a few thousand political 
prisoners. 
With the fall of the Soviet Union in 1989, the Cuban economy collapsed and brought the 
fourth wave Balseros to Miami shores. Since 1989 more Cubans have migrated to US than in any 
other period. Grenier argued that these were the real transnational Cubans who came as part of 
‘family projects’ – mainly young men sent to the United States to earn money and support family 
in Cuba. As different polls on Cuban Americans have shown, these Cubans are the main supporters 
of normalizing bilateral relations between Washington and Havana; this was supported by 
interviewees during the fieldwork who strongly support the removal of restrictions by President 
Obama’s administration. Recent arrivals are also less politically active due to their pre-migration 
life in Cuba or can’t vote during the presidential elections. Their actions are changing US politics 
and prolonging transnational linkages – the return to anti-Castro policies by President Bush had 
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minimal effect. Sending remittances and goods, and travelling have evidenced the transnational 
desire and also a clear division from the pre-Mariel immigrants. As numbers of the ‘Golden Exile’ 
decrease and those who display a transnational identity for ‘normative’ transnational bridges 
increase, a majority of the CAC favour normalization of bilateral relations and abolishment of the 
economic embargo.  
Like the second and third generations, most of the 1.5 generation, e.g. the Pedro Pan 
children, were not traumatized by the revolutionary earthquake. The political memory of exile is 
absent; one Cuban-American indicated that she didn’t understand why she had to leave but, at 14, 
had been aware of the unfolding situation. After migration these children grew up under the exile 
ideology of the politicized community, yet outside the community had assimilated into American 
society and adopted American norms and values. I see this absence of personal hatred towards 
Fidel Castro and resilience in constructing a Cuban identity apart from family and communal 
heritage, as the desire and motivation to have their own Cuban experience. Although the family 
has lost so much, this loss is not part of their lived experience and is compensated by what they 
have gained in the United States. They have developed the desire to engage with Cuba to revitalize 
and rediscover childhood memories, the homeland of family heritage, and the culture and 
narrative of Cuba they grew up with. They carry with them respect for their parents and ancestors, 
who courageously fled the island and rebuilt their life in the United States, according to Gladys 
Goméz-Rossié. Although critical of the Cuban government, they can be objective, like Juan Jimenez, 
who observed the failure of the economic embargo and therefore supported changing Cuba by 
other means. Yet they do not let this become their own life experience. Their experience collides 
with the ABCs as they dwell even further from the seismic shift of the revolution. They are born 
into American society and are susceptible to the family and communal heritage, as they express 
respect for their (grand) parents choices to flee Castro, but don’t bear personal hatred towards 
Fidel Castro. They don’t know Cuba from lived experience, but want to perceive it from their own 
perspective including its impact on their own transnational identity, although like Yllien Verdés, 
some choose to respect their family’s objection and don’t pursue transnational ties. 
As individual stances towards Cuba change with the influx of new migration, the 
transnational identity of the Cuban-American community as a collective is changing too. Like Juan 
Jimenez, some have softened their tone. Others, like William Muir, who have fought Castro with 
their own hands maintain opposition to any involvement with the regime, and some even feel 
betrayed by Obama, like Vicente Blanco Capoté. But the second and third generation hold the 
future and are likely to support further engagement, by perpetuating actual ties despite the 
politics. However, with the ‘wet foot, dry foot’ policy gone, Cuban migration has become somewhat 
normalized. The migration flow of first generation Cuban born is uncertain, and so is the 
preservation of Cuban transnational identity over generations. Some have criticized the lack of 
reciprocity by the Cuban government. Others think that as long as the Cuban government retains 
political power, changing Cuba for the better is most likely to succeed through social-cultural and 
economic engagement. Fidel’s passing and the election of Donald Trump leave the course of 
bilateral relations yet to be decided. Transnational linkages are unlikely to dissolve again, even 
with restrictive government policies. As Eckstein asserted, the more supportive the context, the 
more likely cross-border ties will be beneficial for both societies. 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1 - List of interviewees 
 
American-Born Cubans Personal information Interview 
Cherie Canio 28 years, Director of external 
relations at her family’ company, 
Co-founder of the CubaOne 
Foundation 
By telephone, Miami, 21 June, 
2016 
Daniel Jimenez 35 years, Assistant director at 
Ernst & Young, Co-founder of the 
CubaOne Foundation 
Miami Beach, Miami, 27 May, 
2016 
Elsie Miranda 52 years, Associate professor of 
practical Theology at Barry 
University 
Coral Gables, Miami, 15 June, 
2016 
Yvonne Odette Age unknown (approx. 50-55), 
Manager at a hospital in Miami 
By telephone, Miami, 10 June, 
2016 
Jorge Perez 21 years, Student in Legal 
Psychology 
Miami Beach, Miami, 08 June, 
2016 
Yllien Verdés 45 years, co-owner of a Dental 
office in Miami 
Coral Gables, Miami, 19 June, 
2016 
Post-1980 migrants   
Anonymous 28 years, in the United States 
since 2004, Public Services and 
Acquisition assistant at Cuban 
Heritage Collection, and student 
for Bachelor’s in Public Relations 
Coral Gables, Miami, 15 June, 
2016 
Michel Vain 39 years, in the United States 
since 2009. 
Miami Beach, Miami, 25 May, 
2016 
pre-1980 migrants   
Vicente Blanco-Capoté 73 years, Bay of Pigs veteran and 
co-director of the Bay of Pigs 
museum, and in the United States 
since 1962. 
Little Havana, Miami, 10 June, 
2016 
Gladys Goméz-Rossié 70 years, staff coordinator of 
community relations for the 
Cuban Heritage Collection, in the 
United States since 1962 (Pedro 
Pan). 
Cuban Heritage Collection, Miami, 
17 June, 2016 
Juan Jimenez 63 years, Law librarian, in the US 
from 1962 (Pedro Pan). 
By telephone, Miami, 1 June, 2016 
William Muir 72 years, retired, born in Cuba. By telephone, Miami, 3 June, 2016 
Scholars   
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Dr. Sean Foreman Professor in Political sciences at 
Barry University. 
Barry University, Miami, 7 June, 
2016 
Dr. Andrew Gottlieb PhD in Political Sociology. Restaurant Versailles, Little 
Havana, Miami, 14 June, 2016 
Dr. Guillermo J. Grenier Professor of Sociology and 
Graduate Program Director in the 
Department of Global & 
Sociocultural Studies in the Steven 
J. Green School of International 
and Public Affairs at Florida 
International University, born in 
Havana, Cuba. Lead investigator 
of the FIU Cuba Poll. 
Florida International University, 
Miami, 2 June, 2016 
Dr. Alejandro Portes Research Professor and 
Distinguished Scholar of Arts and 
Sciences, born in Cuba. 
University of Miami, Miami, 20 
June, 2016 
Pedro Roig Senior Research Associate at the 
ICCAS, born in Cuba. 
ICCAS, Miami, 31 May, 2016 
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